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Regulators agree that “the worst loans are made at the top of the business cycle.” (Alan Greenspan, Chicago Bank 
Structure Conference May 10, 2001) 
“Historically, the goals of banking regulation have included…the promotion of competition and efficiency in 
banking…” (Ben Bernanke, Bank Regulation and Supervision: Balancing Benefits and Costs, 2006) 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial crises are very costly for the real economy.1 Much of the costs come from the banking industry. 
Bank failures and performance problems often result in significant negative externalities for other 
connected financial institutions, borrowers, creditors, and other parties in the real economy that depend on 
credit and other services from the failed and distressed institutions, as well as governments that frequently 
get involved in costly bailouts of these banks (e.g., Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley, 1990; James, 1991; 
Lang and Stulz, 1992; Ashcraft, 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter, 
2011; Laeven and Valencia, 2012; Kupiec and Ramirez, 2013; Kang, Lowery, and Wardlaw, 2014). Thus, 
it is critical to understand the major determinants of bank performance during financial crises to tailor public 
policies, regulations, and management practices to detect and reduce the occurrence of bank problems early. 
  As noted in one of the quotes above, bank problems during crises are frequently the result of bad 
decisions made during the normal times that precede them (Greenspan, 2001). One important reason may 
be institutional memory loss. When bank problems have not been prevalent for some time, bank loan 
officers and managers may suffer atrophy in their abilities to recognize and deal with such problems (e.g., 
Berger and Udell, 2004). It is therefore logical to look to the normal times that precede financial crises to 
discover the determinants of bank performance during these crises. The extant literature on the determinants 
of bank performance generally focuses on the time periods immediately previous to this performance, 
irrespective of whether these are crisis or normal times. This paper extends the literature by examining the 
determinants of bank crisis performance in terms of survival, risk, and profitability by focusing on the 
 
1 To illustrate, the subprime financial crisis of the late 2000s is estimated to have cost the U.S. economy in the range 
of $12 trillion-$22 trillion, although many of the economic costs remain difficult to determine (U.S. Department of 





preceding normal time periods, when the problems that are manifested during the crises most likely 
originated. 
The literature on bank performance during crises is also generally limited in the factors that are 
examined. The focus is usually on accounting variables such as capital, liquidity, profitability, and loan 
quality (e.g., Lane, Looney, and Wansley, 1986; Espahbodi, 1991; Cole and Gunther, 1995, 1998; Helwege, 
1996; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995, 2000; Calomiris and Mason, 1997, 2003; Molina, 2002; Elsinger, Lehar, 
and Summer, 2006; Schaeck, 2008; Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer, 2011; Cole and White, 
2012; Knaup and Wagner, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Hong, Huang, and Wu, 2014; Berger, 
Imbierowicz, and Rauch, 2016), the scope of bank activities (investment banking, private equity, new 
financial products (e.g., Cole and White, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 2013), bank ownership and corporate 
governance (e.g., Giannetti and Ongena, 2009; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; 
Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch, 2016; Calomiris and Carlson, 2017), and regional economic conditions 
(e.g., Aubuchon and Wheelock, 2010).  
An overlooked factor affecting bank performance during crises is bank efficiency in the normal 
times prior to the crises. Researchers often study the effects of bank efficiency on bank performance (e.g., 
Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and Hudgins 1993; Hermalin and Wallace, 1994; Berger and Mester, 
1997; Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, and Molyneux 2011; Hughes and Mester, 2015), but none examine the 
effects of efficiency during normal times on performance during subsequent crises. 
The closest paper in approach to ours is Berger and Bouwman (2013), who focus on the effects of 
capital during eight quarters of normal times prior to financial crises on bank survival and market share 
outcomes during the subsequent crises. Our contribution is quite different from theirs in that we focus on 
cost and profit efficiency as potential determinants of bank outcomes, controlling for bank capital and other 
factors included in the literature. In addition, while Berger and Bouwman (2013) include pre-crisis 




product mix, variable input prices, fixed inputs and outputs, environmental factors, and random error. 
We evaluate the effects of both normal-times cost and profit efficiency on bank performance 
because cost and profit efficiency measure different concepts and may affect future outcomes through 
different channels. Cost efficiency measures the proximity of a bank’s cost to that of a best-practice or most 
efficient bank producing the same output that faced the same input prices and environmental conditions. 
Profit efficiency is the more general concept that includes revenues as well as costs. Profit efficiency 
measures the proximity of bank profits to those of a best-practice or most efficient bank under the same 
conditions. The “alternative profit efficiency” measure we employ is based on how much a bank earns 
relative to what would be earned by a best-practice bank that produced the same output and faced the same 
input prices and environmental conditions. Our findings for the two types of efficiency are very different, 
justifying our separate treatment. 
At first blush, cost and profit efficiency may seem to unconditionally lead to better future bank 
outcomes, but the reality is more complex. In fact, relatively high cost and profit efficiency during normal 
times can result in either favorable or unfavorable performance during subsequent financial crises. High 
cost efficiency in normal times may reflect superior managerial quality that endures through the following 
crisis and produces favorable performance. Alternatively, high cost efficiency during normal times may 
reflect “skimping” on resources to screen and monitor loan applicants, which saves resources during normal 
times, but creates poor loan outcomes that become apparent only during subsequent financial crises (e.g., 
Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Both of these channels may also apply to profit efficiency, which encompasses 
costs as well as revenues. 
Additional channels may apply to profit efficiency. High profit efficiency may be associated with 
high charter values that result in favorable performance during subsequent financial crises because bank act 
to preserve these charter values. Alternatively, high profit efficiency during normal times may reflect 




Based on these channels, we formulate and test hypotheses for the effects of both cost and profit 
efficiency during normal times on bank failure, risk, and profitability during subsequent financial crises. 
The data include virtually all U.S. banks from five financial crises originally classified by Berger and 
Bouwman (2013), and their pre-crisis normal time periods – a total of 15,993 banks over the interval from 
1986:Q1 to 2009:Q4. We include multiple financial crises and normal time periods to draw general 
conclusions and minimize the impact of idiosyncratic circumstances of a single crisis. The grouping of 
crises in the analysis is also helpful because it is never known in advance what type of crisis may be coming 
next, so our results can help bank stakeholders prepare for a multiplicity of eventualities. 
We find that cost efficiency during normal times reduces failure probabilities, decreases risk, and 
enhances profitability during subsequent financial crises, while profit efficiency has limited benefits. These 
findings suggest that cost efficiency may proxy well for management quality, while profit efficiency may 
partially reflect temporary high returns during normal times from risky investments. Our results suggest 
that bank stakeholders – including policymakers, regulators, supervisors, owners, creditors, and managers 
– may consider monitoring more closely banks with low cost efficiency during normal times so as to reduce 
the occurrence of costly bank problems during financial crises. In addition, managerial policies and 
procedures that promote cost efficiency, which could improve performance during subsequent crises. Our 
findings also suggest that researchers consider putting more trust in cost efficiency as an indicator of bank 
quality than profit efficiency. 
We perform a variety of robustness checks. First, we test the sensitivity of our results to using 
alternative measures of bank performance. Second, we run the regressions separately for banking and 
market crises, those that originated in the banking sector and in financial markets, respectively. Third, we 
exclude banks that may be too-big-to-fail (TBTF) to mitigate the potential concern that our results may be 
driven by such banks. Fourth, we run tests when controlling for a simpler measure of efficiency used in the 
literature, total bank costs to total bank revenues (cost-to-income). Fifth, we consider alternative pre-crisis 




pre-crisis time period. Sixth, we consider the effects of efficiency on small versus large banks. Finally, we 
run tests which allow for the possibility of nonlinear relations between efficiency and the bank 
performance. Our main findings stand up to all of these robustness checks.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the cost and profit 
efficiency concepts and measurement. Section 3 describes the channels through which normal-times bank 
cost and profit efficiency may influence subsequent financial crisis performance and develops opposing 
hypotheses from these channels. Section 4 discusses our empirical framework – it gives our approach, 
describes the financial crises and normal times, and explains the regression models and key bank 
performance variables. Section 5 displays the data sample and sources. Section 6 reports reviews the 
summary statistics and presents our main regression results. Section 7 discusses robustness checks and 
Section 8 provides a deeper analysis of our cost efficiency results. Section 9 concludes.  
2. Cost and Profit Efficiency Concepts and Measurement 
2.1 Cost and Profit Efficiency Concepts 
Banks often pursue the economic goals of cost minimization and/or profit maximization. Researchers for 
the last three decades measure how well banks achieve these goals through the concepts of cost efficiency 
and profit efficiency. The cost efficiency of a bank tells us how close a bank’s cost is to what a best-practice 
bank’s cost for producing the same current level of output under the same conditions. It is measured by the 
ratio of the minimum cost a best-practice bank would incur to the bank’s actual cost if the two banks 
produced the same output quantities and faced the same conditions (same input prices and environmental 
conditions).  
Conversely, the profit efficiency of the bank tells us how close a bank is to producing the maximum 
possible profit of a best-practice banks under the same conditions. It is measured as the ratio of a bank’s 
actual profit earned to the maximum profit a best-practice bank would attain for the same input prices, 




and Humphrey, 1993; Soteriou and Zenios, 1999; Maudos, Pastor, Perez, and Quesada, 2002). Profit 
efficiency is a broader concept than cost efficiency because the profit function allows for consideration of 
revenues as well as costs. 
For our purposes in this paper, we take output quantities, rather than output prices as given, and 
measure “alternative profit efficiency.” As discussed in Berger and Mester (1997), alternative profit 
efficiency is preferred as it provides additional information when some of the assumptions required by 
standard profit efficiency – relatively homogeneous output quality, easily-changed output quantities, highly 
competitive output markets, and well-measured output prices – do not hold. Because of the inherent benefits, 
most bank profit efficiency papers over the past 20 years use alternative profit efficiency (e.g., Vander 
Vennet, 2002; Restrepo-Tobon and Kumbhakar, 2014; Wheelock and Wilson, 2016). 
It might be expected that bank managers would always strive for both high cost and profit efficiency, 
that the two measures would be strongly positively correlated, and that both would predict favorable future 
outcomes, but the reality is more complex. Cost and profit efficiency may not be strongly positively related 
because bank outputs have quality differences that are difficult to measure. Higher-quality services may 
require higher costs and result in lower measured cost efficiency, but fetch higher output prices that result 
in higher profits and measured profit efficiency (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997; Lozano-Vivas, 1997; Rogers, 
1998; Maudos, Pastor, Perez, and Quesada, 2002). Bank outputs may also have different risk characteristics 
that are challenging to measure. Higher-risk outputs typically have higher expected returns, which may 
boost profit efficiency during normal times and may not have favorable effects on cost efficiency. As 
discussed in Section 3, high cost and profit efficiency during normal times may predict either favorable or 
unfavorable bank performance during subsequent financial crises, depending on the relative importance of 
several different channels.  
2.2 Efficiency Measurement 




and use statistics computed over all the quarters of these periods to reduce the impact of outliers. 
2.2.1 Variables Included in the Cost and Alternative Profit Functions 
The first step in computing efficiency is the choice of variables specified in the cost and alternative profit 
functions. We define total costs as total interest expenses plus total noninterest expenses, and total profits 
as total bank net income. We specify four input prices: w1, price of labor (ratio of total personnel expenses 
to number of employees); w2, price of physical capital (total operating and administrative expenses to total 
premises and fixed assets); w3, price of purchased funds ((total interest expenses - total interest on core 
deposits)/(quantity of total liabilities – core deposits)); and w4, price of core deposits ((total interest on 
deposits - interest on time deposits over $100,000)/quantity of core deposits).2 We use the following five 
output quantities: y1, consumer loans; y2, commercial and industrial (C&I) loans; y3, residential real estate 
(RRE) loans (1-4 family); y4, commercial real estate (CRE) loans (total real estate loans - RRE loans); y5, 
other loans (total loans - (y1+ y2 + y3 + y4)). We also include quantities of two fixed netputs (inputs or 
outputs): z1, the notional value of total bank off-balance sheet activities; and z2, bank financial equity 
capital.3 Finally, we include an environmental variable to account for the risk exposure of the bank, v, the 
weighted nonperforming loan ratio of all banks in the bank’s state, where the weights are based on the 
 
2 Complete data for the input prices w3 and w4 are not available in the Call Report prior to 1997 due to insufficient 
information on the core deposits. Therefore, we calculate an average ratio of core deposits to total deposits for each 
bank over the periods that data are available. We assume that the bank uses the same ratio in the earlier time periods 
where we cannot determine this based on the Call Report (1986:Q1 – 1996:Q4). If for a bank we cannot compute the 
ratio described as no reports are available, we use the industry ratio average by size class. 
3 In choosing outputs, we focus on modern banking theories in which banks intermediate deposits into loans and also 
engage in off-balance sheet activities. Under many of these theories, banks are special because they screen and monitor 
on-balance sheet loans and off-balance sheet loan commitments and similar claims to liquid funds (e.g., Diamond, 
1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986; James, 1987). We specifically exclude other earning 
assets or securities as outputs, since these are methods of storing liquidity for banks so that they might have funds 
available to make future loans or respond to liquidity shocks from liabilities or off-balance sheet activities. Under 
other recent theories of bank liquidity creation, securities actually subtract from banking output, and they receive 
negative weights in liquidity creation empirical measures (e.g., Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Berger and 





proportions of deposits of the banks in the state.4 
2.2.2 Specification of the Cost and Alternative Profit Functions 
We use the Fourier-flexible functional form for the cost and alternative profit functions to estimate bank-
specific efficiency measures, which are used subsequently in panel estimations of effects of bank efficiency 
on bank performance. Prior research shows that the Fourier-flexible form is preferable to functional forms 
based on second-order Taylor series expansions, such as the translog or normalized quadratic (e.g., Gallant, 
1981, 1982; Berger and Mester, 1997). The Fourier-flexible form incorporates the translog and augments it 
by including Fourier trigonometric terms, so it is more flexible than the translog, and is a global 
approximation to virtually any cost or profit function. In addition, many researchers found that it fits the 
data for U.S. banks better than other functional forms (e.g., McAllister and McManus, 1993; Mitchell and 
Onvural, 1996). For the cost function, we specify:  
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4 A small minority of banks are in multiple states. Since we only know the location of deposits from the Summary of 
Deposits data for these banks, we allocate nonperforming loans proportionately to the states according to the location 




where ( )2/ky z and ( )1 2/z z have one added to avoid taking the natural log of zero, the nx ’s are rescaled 
terms of the ( )4ln /iw w  , ( )2ln /ky z  , and ( )1 2ln /z z  , so that each of the nx  lies in the interval 
 0,2  , where π indicates radians (rather than profits as below).5 We apply the standard symmetry 
restrictions to the translog part of the function (i.e., ,ij ji km mk= =    ). In the composed error term, cln  
represents noise and ln cu represents cost inefficiency. 
The alternative profit function requires a few changes. The dependent variable is
( ) ( )
min
4 2 4 2ln / / 1w z w z
 + +
 
   , where ( )
min
4 2/ w z  indicates that the absolute value of the 
minimum value of normalized profit, and the ( )
min
4 2/ 1w z +  is added so we can take the natural log of 
a positive number, since minimum profits are usually negative. The composed error is ln ln+u  . 
As shown above, we normalize the cost, profit, and input price terms by the last input price 4w  to 
ensure linear homogeneity, and normalize cost, profit, output quantities, and fixed netput quantities by the 
last fixed netput financial equity capital 2z . These normalizations are fairly standard in the cost and profit 
function literature. Normalizing by one input price in the Fourier-flexible functional form is the only way 
to ensure linear homogeneity, so that doubling all input prices exactly doubles costs on the efficient frontier. 
Normalization by a fixed netput makes sure that the banks are treated comparably and not subject to scale 
bias – otherwise the large banks would dominate the regressions. Normalization by equity helps with 
economic interpretation of the profit function, given that the dependent variable is proportional to profits 
per dollar of equity, or return on equity. 
 
5  Following Berger and Mester (1997), we cut 10% off each end of the  0,2  interval so that the nx  span 
 0.1 2 ,0.9 2    to reduce approximation problems near the endpoints. The formula for nx  is 
(0.2 )a variable   −  +   , where  ,a b   is the range of the variable being transformed and 





2.2.3 Measuring Efficiency from the Estimated Cost and Alternative Profit Functions 
The key to measuring efficiency is disentangling inefficiency lnu , from random error ln . Since we 
have a number of time periods, our preferred method for the estimation of efficiency is the distribution-free 
approach, which disentangles them by assuming that inefficiencies are relatively stable and random errors 
tend to average out to zero over time (Berger, 1993). 
We estimate the cost and alternative profit functions separately for each quarter of a normal-times 
interval to account for possible changes over time in technology, regulation, and external environment. We 
then average the residuals over all the quarters of the normal-times period to obtain preliminary estimates 
of the inefficiency term lnu for each bank, effectively assuming that the random error ln averages out 
to zero over time. To avoid the impact of extreme values, we follow Berger and Mester (1997) and winsorize 
the extreme values. Specifically, those banks in the top and bottom 5% are assigned values of banks at the 
95th and 5th percentiles, respectively.6 Cost efficiency for each bank and each quarter is estimated as the 
ratio of minimum predicted cost for that bank to the actual predicted costs. The minimum predicted cost 
for the bank uses the values of the cost function arguments for that bank and the minimum cost function 
truncated average residual for the sample. The actual predicted costs for the bank also use the values of the 
cost function for that bank combined with the truncated average residual for the bank. 
These cost efficiencies are then ranked for each quarter in descending order of efficiency, so that a 
bank that is more efficient than 80% of the observations for that quarter is assigned a 0.80 cost efficiency 
rank for that quarter. We then average the ranks over all the quarters of the normal-times period to obtain a 
comparable measure to use in our regression models of bank performance in the subsequent financial crisis. 
We prefer efficiency ranks to levels because ranks remove changes in the distributions of efficiency over 
time that are not relevant to our hypotheses. Average profit efficiency ranks are determined in similar 
fashion, except that they are based on the ratio of actual predicted profit for that bank to the maximum 
 




predicted profit.7  
3. Hypothesis Development 
We next discuss channels through which normal-times bank cost and profit efficiency may affect likelihood 
of failure, risk, and profitability of banks during subsequent financial crises, and form hypotheses from 
these channels. Section 3.1 describes the cost efficiency channels, Section 3.2 explains the profit efficiency 
channels, and Section 3.3 gives the resulting hypotheses. 
3.1. Channels for Bank Cost Efficiency 
High cost efficiency during normal times can have either favorable or unfavorable effects on bank 
performance during subsequent financial crises. The favorable effects go through the following channel: 
• Good management channel: If management that is proficient at keeping costs down 
during normal times is also proficient at managing portfolios, then high cost efficiency may 
be associated with lower likelihood of bank failure, lower risk, and greater profitability 
during subsequent financial crises (e.g., Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 
1997; Williams, 2004). 
The unfavorable effects of high cost efficiency operate through the following alternative channel: 
• Skimping channel: Banks may achieve high cost efficiency during normal times by 
devoting relatively few resources to screening and monitoring loan applicants. This 
“skimping” channel, introduced by Berger and DeYoung (1997), improves cost efficiency 
during normal times and may not be noticed because the resulting poor loan performance 
only becomes apparent during subsequent financial crises. 
 
7 We do not include bank fixed effects in the cost and profit function estimations because these regressions are 
estimated quarterly and have only one bank observation per quarter. However, our efficiency estimation methods that 




3.2. Channels for Bank Profit Efficiency 
Profit efficiency may operate through the same two channels as cost efficiency because profit efficiency 
includes the effects of costs as well as revenues. Thus, the good management channel may also apply to 
profit efficiency because good cost managers are not expected to be significantly worse at managing 
revenues. Similarly, the skimping channel may also apply to profit efficiency as long as revenues during 
normal times are not significantly adversely affected by skimping. This may occur because even poor loans 
may perform well outside of crisis periods. 
There are two additional channels through which profit efficiency during normal times may 
favorably or unfavorably affect financial crisis performance. The additional favorable effects go through 
the following channel: 
• Charter value channel: A bank with high profit efficiency may be expected to have 
relatively high future profits, and therefore greater charter value. It is often found that banks 
with greater charter value due to a different source, market power, behave more prudently 
to protect this value (e.g., Marcus 1984, Keeley 1990, Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan 
1996, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 2000, Carletti and Hartmann 2003, Jimenez, Lopez, 
and Saurina 2013). The same logic applies to high profit efficiency, since banks with high 
profit efficiency are generally more profitable. Thus, banks with high normal-times profit 
efficiency may behave more prudently and be more likely to survive, have relatively low 
risk, and relatively high profits during subsequent financial crises. 
The additional unfavorable effects go through the following channel: 
• Risk-taking channel: Banks may achieve high profit efficiency during normal times by 
taking on more risk, since high-risk investments generally have higher returns during 
normal times. The higher risk-taking during normal times may turn into higher failure 




investments generally suffer losses.8 
3.3. Hypotheses Derived from the Channels 
These channels imply two opposing hypotheses each for the effects of normal-times bank cost and profit 
efficiency on performance during subsequent financial crises:  
Hypothesis 1a.  Higher cost efficiency during normal times results in better 
performance (lower likelihood of failure, lower risk, and higher profitability) during 
subsequent financial crises.  
Hypothesis 1b.  Higher cost efficiency during normal times results in worse 
performance (higher likelihood of failure, higher risk, and lower profitability) during 
subsequent financial crises. 
Hypothesis 2a.  Higher profit efficiency during normal times results in better 
performance (lower likelihood of failure, lower risk, and higher profitability) during 
subsequent financial crises.  
Hypothesis 2b.  Higher profit efficiency during normal times results in worse 
performance (higher likelihood of failure, higher risk, and lower profitability) during 
subsequent financial crises.  
These hypotheses may apply to different degrees to different sets of banks. Our empirical analysis 
tests which of Hypotheses 1a or 1b and which of 2a and 2b empirically dominates the other overall.  
4. Empirical Framework 
 
8 To illustrate, banks’ investments in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) were very profitable during the normal time 
period prior to the subprime financial crisis, but proved very risky and a significant contributing factor to bank failures 
and the crisis (e.g., Acharya, Philippon, Richardson, and Roubini, 2009; Acharya and Richardson, 2009; Diamond 




This section explains our empirical approach for the failure, risk, and profitability analyses. It also describes 
the financial crises and normal times. 
4.1. Empirical Approach and Descriptions of Financial Crises and Normal Times 
Our main approach pools the data to treat financial crises and their preceding normal times as a 
group. We focus on five crises that occurred between 1986:Q1 and 2009:Q4, which were created by Berger 
and Bouwman (2013). They include two banking crises (crises that originated in the banking sector) and 
three market crises (originated outside banking in the financial markets). The banking crises are the credit 
crunch of the early 1990s (1990:Q1–1992:Q4) and the subprime lending crisis (2007:Q3–2009:Q4). The 
market crises are the 1987 stock market crash (1987:Q4); the Russian debt crisis and Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) bailout of 1998 (1998:Q3–1998:Q4); and the bursting of the dot.com bubble and the 
September 11 terrorist attacks of the early 2000s (2000:Q2–2002:Q3). Normal times include all the quarters 
since previous crisis, except the first normal times period begins at the start of the data set. The financial 
crises and normal times are graphed in Figure 1. As discussed above, in our main analysis, we include all 
the crises in order to draw general conclusions and because it is never known which type of crisis is coming 
next. 
Thus, for the full sample, we have a five-period panel, in which each period corresponds to a 
different financial crisis. The dependent variables are measures of performance during the crises, and the 
explanatory variables are measured during the normal time period preceding these financial crises. We have 
an unbalanced panel, given that some banks enter the sample later, fail, or are merged out of existence 
during the sample, with the number of observations for each bank varying between one and five. All 
dependent and independent variables are averages of the quarterly values over the appropriate crisis or 
normal time period. 
4.2 Regression Models 
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Performance Indicatori,t is a measure of bank i’s failure, risk, or profitability during crisis period t, t ∈ 
{1,2,3,4,5}. Specifically, our performance measures are as follows. For failure, we use: 
i) FAILED1i,t, a dummy equal to one if bank i failed as it was placed under receivership or 
closed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), given it was unable to meet 
its obligations to depositors and other stakeholders,9 and thus was included in the FDIC 
failure list, or experienced book-value insolvency or technical default (bank became 
critically undercapitalized, its equity capitalization fell below 2% of bank gross total assets 
(GTA10))11 in crisis period t. 
ii) FAILED2i,t, a dummy equal to one if bank i failed as it was placed under receivership or 
closed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), given it was unable to meet 
its obligations to depositors and other stakeholders, and thus was included in the FDIC 
failure list in crisis period t. 
We prefer FAILED1 as our main measure of bank failure, given it is more comprehensive, including bank 
technical defaults, consistent with other prior research in banking (e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 1995, 2000; 
Cole and White, 2012). FAILED2 is also used as an alternative. 
 
9 As receiver, the FDIC has the role to resolve a failed institution in order to maximize the return on the assets of the 
failed bank and minimize any loss to the deposit insurance fund. To accomplish a resolution, FDIC can 1) merge a 
failed institution with another insured depository institution and transfer its assets and liabilities, 2) form a new 
institution, known as a bridge bank, to take over the assets and liabilities of the failed institution, or 3) sell or pledge 
the assets of the failed institution to the FDIC in its corporate capacity (e.g., FDIC, 2013). The FDIC bank failure list 
is available at: https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. 
10 Gross total assets (GTA) equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer 
risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). Total assets on Call Reports deduct these two reserves, which are 
held to cover potential credit losses. We add these reserves back to measure the full value of the assets financed. 
11 This definition of technical default is consistent with the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which requires regulators 





As proxies for risk12, we use: 
i) LN(ΖSCORE)i,t, log of the sum of a bank’s mean ROA (net income over GTA) and mean 
CAPITAL RATIO (equity capital over GTA) divided by σROA (the volatility of ROA), 
where the means of the components are calculated over crisis period t. 
ii) σ ROA i,t, volatility of return on assets (ROA) of bank i over crisis period t. 
As proxies for profitability, we use: 
i) ROAi,t, return on assets (net income over GTA) of bank i averaged over crisis period t.  
ii) ROEi,t, return on equity (net income over capital equity) of bank i averaged over crisis 
period t.13  
Equation (2) is run as a logit for the failure variables, and as OLS for the continuous outcome measures. 
COSTEFFi,PRE-t, and PROFITEFFi,PRE-t are profit and cost efficiency ranks over the normal time period prior 
to the financial crisis. Other Bank Characteristicsi,PRE-t is a set of control variables averaged over the normal 
times period. Crisisi,t is a set of individual crises dummies, which act as time fixed effects. We exclude one 
crisis dummy to avoid perfect collinearity.  
To address potential concerns that error terms may be heteroscedastic or correlated across time 
periods for each bank, we run all regressions adjusting the standard errors for heteroscedasticity and within-
bank clustering.  
5. Data Sample, Sources, and Control Variables 
 
12 Both risk measures, LN(ΖSCORE) and σ ROA, cannot be calculated over one of the market crises – the stock market 
crash of 1987:Q4 – which lasts only one quarter. The statistics and regressions using these measures therefore have 
smaller numbers of observations than the variables for failure and performance, dropping from 48,532 to 35,151 
observations. 
13 To address concerns related to differences in performance for banks with potentially different tax treatments (e.g., 
S corporations versus C corporations), we also try using alternative definitions of ROA and ROE that use income 
before applicable income taxes over GTA and equity capital, respectively. Untabulated results using these alternative 




This section first explains our data sample and sources, followed by details on the control variables. The 
key independent variables measuring efficiency are described in Section 2 above. Table 1 Panel A shows 
variable definitions. 
5.1. Data Sample and Sources 
We acquire bank data from quarterly Call Reports, which contain financial information on all U.S. 
commercial banks, over the period 1986:Q1 to 2009:Q4.14 We adjust the data to be in real 2009:Q4 terms 
using the GDP price deflator. We omit observations that do not refer to commercial banks, observations 
with missing or incomplete financial data on basic accounting variables such as total assets and equity, as 
well as those with no outstanding loans or deposits. Finally, following Berger and Bouwman (2013) and 
others, for all observations with total equity less than 1% of total assets, we replace equity with 1% of total 
assets to minimize distortions in ratios that contain equity.15 Variables are aggregated for each bank over 
financial crises and normal time periods. These leaves us with a final sample of 48,532 bank-time period 
observations for 15,993 commercial banks over the sample period.16  
5.2. Control Variables 
In our main performance regressions, we specify both a basic and a broad set of control variables. The basic 
set includes COST EFF MOMENTUM and PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM, the proportions of quarters in 
 
14 We focus on U.S. commercial banks, rather than BHCs, given that banks within holding companies have their own 
board of directors and managers, and thus many of the managerial decisions are made at the bank level. In addition, 
BHCs engage in many other activities that are more difficult to standardize than our simple banking outputs. However, 
we do control for whether banks are members of BHCs in all our models to capture any differences that may be driven 
by this membership. 
15 For example, if a bank’s capital to GTA ratio is less than 1%, we calculate ROE as net income divided by 1% of 
assets. Otherwise, for observations for which equity is between 0% and 1% of assets, dividing by equity would result 
in extraordinarily high values. When equity is negative, the conventionally-defined ROE would have a reversed sign 
and would not make economic sense. We do not drop these low or negative capital observations because they are 
likely the most informative of banks’ ability to survive and thrive during financial crises. 
16 In an unreported robustness test, we exclude bank-time period observations (5,466) that are affected by mergers as 
per the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago mergers dataset. All our results remain consistent and similar to our main 
findings using this treatment of the data. We keep these observations in for our main analysis as M&As are key ways 




which the cost and profit function residual ranks, respectively, improved over the normal times period. It is 
expected that banks that improved their efficiencies more over a normal times period would have more 
momentum to perform better over the subsequent crisis period than banks that decreased efficiency. The 
basic controls also include CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS, the set of individual crises dummies, which act as 
time fixed effects.  
In the broad set of controls, we also include proxies for risk and opacity, size and safety net 
protection, ownership, organizational structure and strategy, competition, and location, described below. In 
all cases, the control variables are measured during each pre-crisis normal-times period before the 
performance variables, which are measured during the subsequent crises. 
5.2.1. Risk and Opacity Indicators 
Banks with riskier and more opaque portfolios in the pre-crisis normal times may be more likely to fail, 
have higher risk, and less profitability during subsequent financial crises (e.g., Ng and Rusticus, 2011). 
Proxies for risk and opacity are as follows. CAPITAL RATIO: Bank capitalization is defined as the bank’s 
equity divided by GTA. It measures the extent to which a bank can absorb potential losses and is generally 
thought to be associated with improved monitoring and reduced moral hazard incentives to take risk. This 
variable is found to reduce probability of failure in almost all bank failure studies (e.g., Cole and White, 
2012) and to improve performance during financial crises (e.g., Berger and Bouwman, 2013). TOTAL 
LOANS / GTA: The ratio of total loans to GTA. Banks with higher loan ratios tend to have greater credit 
risk. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO: Commercial real estate loans divided by GTA. Research finds that 
commercial real estate loans is an important determinant of bank failures during the recent financial crisis 
(e.g., Cole and White, 2012; Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch, 2016). BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO: 
Brokered deposits divided by GTA. Some banks obtain large deposits from deposit brokers. Such deposits 
however are expensive, and the funds are usually invested in high-risk activities to cover the high costs. 
While some researchers suggest that brokered deposits cannot directly explain bank failure (e.g., Rossi, 




UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO: Unused commitments divided by GTA. As noted in Cornett, McNutt, 
Strahan, and Tehranian (2011), unused commitments expose banks to liquidity risk, and also experience an 
increase in demand during crises. CASH HOLDINGS RATIO: Cash holdings divided by GTA. High cash 
holding can reduce liquidity risk for banks and could help them survive, but they can also be associated 
with more agency problems (e.g., Jensen 1986). LLA / GTA: Loan loss allowance divided by GTA. The 
loan loss allowance measures expected future loan losses, and indicates greater credit risk. 17  LOAN 
CONCENTRATION: A bank’s loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) of the following six loan categories: commercial real estate, residential real estate, commercial and 
industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. The larger is the loan HHI is, the more concentrated and 
potentially riskier is the loan portfolio. 
5.2.2. Size and Regulatory Indicators 
We control for size and safety net protection using several indicators. LN(GTA): The natural log of GTA. 
Bank size is expected to have favorable effects on future performance because larger banks are better 
diversified, have higher survival odds, and scale economies. The largest banks may also have better safety 
net protection, which we deal with in a robustness check below. We control for the primary federal 
supervisor, which may affect bank performance during financial crises because of differences in quality of 
oversight and leniency: SUPERVISOR_OCC (for national banks), SUPERVISOR_FDIC (for state 
nonmember banks), and SUPERVISOR_FRS (for state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System). We exclude the latter from the regressions to avoid perfect collinearity. 
5.2.3. Bank Ownership Indicators 
We use two indicators of bank ownership. BHC MEMBER: Dummy equal to one if the bank was part of a 
bank holding company (BHC) at any time in the period preceding the crisis. BHC membership is expected 
 
17 We obtain qualitatively similar results when using the ratio of nonperforming loans to GTA instead of LLA/GTA 




to help a bank survive, reduce its risk, improve its profitability during a crisis because the holding company 
may act as a source of strength to all the banks it owns (Houston, James, and Marcus, 1997). PUBLICLY 
LISTED: Dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed. Banks that are publicly 
listed have increased monitoring from shareholders and an additional source for raising capital, which may 
positively affect performance. Alternatively, it may increase failure probability and risk because of 
heightened incentives to take advantage of debt holders and the government safety net relative to private 
owners, which are often family members (e.g., Armour and Gordon, 2014; Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman, 
2015). FOREIGN OWNERSHIP: Foreign ownership dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign 
ownership.  
5.2.4. Organizational Structure Indicators 
Centralized organizations are complex and tend to rely on hard information, while decentralized 
organizations are less complex and rely more on soft information (Stein, 2002), so organizational 
complexity may affect performance. We create two variables that capture this complexity: BRANCHES / 
GTA: (ratio of total bank branches over GTA) x 1000, and LN (NUMBER STATES): Natural log of the 
number of states in which the bank has branches. Banks with more branches per dollar of assets and those 
that operate in more states tend to have more complex organizational structures. 
5.2.5. Competition Indicators 
Some research suggests that increased competition reduces franchise value and increases risk and the 
likelihood of failure (e.g., Keeley, 1990). Others argue that competition reduces risk and the likelihood of 
failure (e.g., Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). Still others suggest the relation may be nonmonotonic (e.g., 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010). The empirical research finds some merit in all of these positions (e.g., 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Beck, 2008; Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; Berger, 
Imbierowicz, and Rauch, 2016). We control for the degree of bank local competition, proxied by HHI 




bank’s weighted market share of deposits in the markets in which it operates. Markets are Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs), New England County Metroplitan Areas (NECMAs), or rural counties.18 The 
larger is HHI, the greater is a bank’s market power. Finally, we control for PERCENT METROPOLITAN – 
percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs). Banks with a higher metropolitan 
presence may experience more competition. 
5.2.6. Local Economic Conditions Indicators 
We use two indicators of local economic conditions. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX: Weighted average 
of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state coincident indices based on deposit shares. The 
coincident index combines four state-level indicators to summarize economic conditions.19 Banks in states 
with better economic conditions may be less likely to fail, less risky, and more profitable (e.g., Bayazitova 
and Shivdasani, 2012). HOUSE PRICE INFLATION: House price index (HPI) growth is the weighted 
average growth in a state-level HPI from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) based on deposit 
shares. This may have important effects on bank performance since real estate is often used as collateral. 
6. Empirical Analysis 
6.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 Panel B contains summary statistics for all financial crises, and separately for banking and market 
crises. The dependent performance variables are measured during the crises and the independent efficiency 
and control variables are measured during the prior normal-times periods. The average bank has a failure 
(FAILED1) likelihood of 1.7% when considering actual FDIC bank failures and bank technical default 
(capitalization ratio of less than 2%), and a failure (FAILED2) likelihood of 0.8% when considering actual 
 
18 HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares (deposits) of each individual bank. We use the bank deposit data 
from the FDIC Summary of Deposits for the period 2005 to 2009 combined with data from Christa Bouwman for the 
period 1986 to 2004. 
19 The four indicators are: nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the 
unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the Consumer Price Index. 20 This last 




FDIC failures alone. The risk variables are LN(ΖSCORE), with a mean of 3.200 (mean of ZSCORE is 
49.243), and standard deviation of ROA, σROA, with a mean of 0.008. Bank ΖSCORE, which measures risk 
inversely, is considered to be the more complete measure of risk, since it takes into account capital and 
mean earnings, as well as the standard deviation of earnings. Profitability is measured by return on assets 
(ROA) with a mean of 0.005; and return on equity (ROE) with a mean of 0.059. 
Our key independent variables measured during the pre-crisis normal times periods are COSTEFF, 
with a mean of 0.500, and PROFITEFF, with a mean of 0.498. The efficiency means are around 0.50 by 
construction of the ranks.  
Turning to the controls, COST EFF MOMENTUM and PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM have means 
of 0.596 and 0.591, respectively. These means exceed the means of the efficiency rank distributions of 0.50 
because the banks with the lowest efficiency scores tend to fail or be acquired and drop out of the sample. 
Regarding risk and opacity characteristics, the average bank has capitalization ratio (CAPITAL RATIO) of 
0.101, TOTAL LOANS / GTA of 0.557, COMMERCIAL RE RATIO of 0.146, BROKERED DEPOSITS 
RATIO of 0.007, UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO of 0.075, CASH HOLDINGS RATIO of 0.070, LLA / 
GTA ratio of 0.009, and a LOAN CONCENTRATION of 0.316. Regarding size and safety net protection 
characteristics, the average bank has a size LN(GTA) of 11.454 (mean of GTA is $621.583 million) and 
29.7%, 60.9%, and 9.4% have OCC, FDIC, and FRS as their primary federal regulator, respectively.20 As 
regards ownership, 72.1% of the banks are in BHCs (BHCs), 11.5% of the banks are publicly listed, and 
9% of the banks are foreign-owned. For ownership structure, the average banks has BRANCHES / GTA of 
0.030 and LN(NUMBER STATES) of 0.012. In terms of competition, the average bank has a HHI 
DEPOSITS of 0.086 and PERCENT METROPOLITAN of 0.466. Finally, local economic indicators show 
that the average bank is exposed in the markets in which it operates to a CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX 
of 0.206 and HOUSE PRICE INFLATION of 0.426.  
 




When looking at key variables over banking versus market financial crises, statistics are mostly 
consistent, except that we observe more failures and higher risk during banking crises. With regard to 
controls, the average bank has a higher COMMERCIAL RE RATIO, higher BROKERED DEPOSITS 
RATIO, higher LLA / GTA, negative values for the CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX, and lower increases 
in HOUSE PRICE INFLATION prior to banking crises, suggesting more increases in risk in the normal 
times leading to banking crises. 
6.2. Regression Analysis Based on Grouping Financial Crises Together 
In this section, we discuss the main empirical results based on grouping financial crises together. 
6.2.1. How Does Pre-Crisis Efficiency Affect Banks’ Likelihood of Failure during Financial Crises? 
Table 2 Panel A present the bank failure regression coefficients with minimal controls. Columns (1), (3), 
and (5) use the FAILED1 measure, while columns (2), (4), and (6) show results using FAILED2. We use 
logit models and include only cost efficiency in Columns (1) and (2), only profit efficiency in Columns (3) 
and (4), and both efficiency measures in Columns (5) and (6). Panel B has the same format, but uses the 
full set of control variables.  
We consistently find that pre-crisis cost efficiency statistically significantly helps banks reduce 
their probability of failure during financial crises. Turning to economic significance, in the most complete 
specifications in Panel B Columns (5) and (6), we find that moving cost efficiency during normal times 
from 0 to 1, i.e., from the most inefficient to the most efficient, decreases the probability of bank failure 
during financial crises by 64% (from 0.028 to 0.010) in Column (5) for FAILED1 and 95% (from 0.043 to 
0.002) in Column (6) for FAILED2. These results support the good management channel over the 
skimping channel, consistent with the empirical dominance of Hypothesis 1a over 1b. 
The results also suggest that profit efficiency generally has no statistically or economically 
significant effect on the likelihood of failure. When controlling for cost efficiency, the coefficient is only 




efficiency is inclusive of both costs and revenues, and cost efficiency has a strong negative effect on the 
probability of failure, these results provide at least modest evidence of the risk-taking channel – that 
revenues decline during subsequent financial crises from high revenues from additional risk-taking during 
pre-crisis normal times. These results suggest that neither Hypothesis 2a nor 2b empirically dominate 
because the cost and revenue effects cancel each other out. 
Turning to the controls in Table 2 Panel B, the coefficients generally have the predicted signs. 
Banks with cost and profit efficiency momentum, larger size, higher capitalization, lower ratio of total 
loans, members of BHCs, lower ratios of commercial real estate loans, fewer brokered deposits, less unused 
commitments, reduced loan loss allowance ratios, publicly traded, with positive changes in coincident 
indices and house price inflation, and lower loan concentrations are less likely to fail during the financial 
crises. The other controls do not have clear sign predictions.  
6.2.2. How Does Pre-Crisis Efficiency Affect Bank Risk during Financial Crises? 
Table 3 presents the results for our proxies of bank risk during financial crises, LN(ΖSCORE) and 
LN(σROA), following the same format as Table 2. Cost efficiency decreases risk during crises in all cases, 
and is statistically significant in all but one case. The findings are economically significant for the more 
complete LN(ΖSCORE) measure, but not for σROA. In the most complete specification in Panel B Columns 
(5) and (6), we find that moving cost efficiency during normal times from 0 to 1 increases LN(ΖSCORE) 
during financial crises by 8.5% (from 3.07 to 3.33) in Column (5), which is economically significant, and 
produces an average reduction in σROA by 33% (from 0.009 to 0.006) in Column (6). The risk results again 
support the good management channel over the skimping channel, and the empirical dominance of 
Hypothesis 1a over 1b.  
Profit efficiency does not have statistically significant effects on risk in the full specification in 
Panel B, and has a deleterious effect on risk in Panel A, as reflected by statistically lower LN(ΖSCORE). 




efficiency findings suggest that high revenues during normal times are associated with increased risk during 
the subsequent financial crises. Thus, the data suggest that profit efficiency during normal times may 
partially reflect engagement in high expected return-high risk activities that have negative consequences 
during subsequent crises, consistent with the risk-taking channel and the empirical dominance of 
Hypothesis 2b over 2a.  
Turning to the controls, most of the coefficients are in line with expectations. Banks with more 
efficiency momentum, larger sizes, lower loan ratios, BHC members, lower ratios of commercial real estate 
loans, lower ratios of brokered deposits, positive changes in economic conditions, and lower loan 
concentration tend to reduce have lower risk during subsequent financial crises.  
6.2.3. How Does Pre-Crisis Efficiency Affect Banks’ Profitability during Financial Crises? 
Table 4 presents the results for the two measures of bank profitability, ROA and ROE, again following the 
same format. Cost efficiency consistently increases profitability during subsequent crises, while profit 
efficiency has little effect. The cost efficiency coefficients are all statistically significant and are 
economically significant for ROE as well. In Panel B Columns (5) and (6), we find that moving cost 
efficiency during normal times from 0 to 1 increases ROA during financial crises by 75% (from 0.004 to 
0.007) in Column (5), and increases ROE during financial crises by 51% (from 0.047 to 0.071) in Column 
(6). Again, the results support the good management channel over the skimping channel and are 
consistent with empirical dominance of Hypothesis 1a over 1b. 
The profit efficiency results, by contrast, show no increase in profitability during subsequent crises. 
The coefficients are small, and the only ones that are significant are negative. Again, since profit efficiency 
is inclusive of cost efficiency, the marginal effects of higher revenues during normal times presage 
decreases in profitability during the following financial crises, more consistent with the risk-taking 
channel than the charter value channel and the empirical dominance of Hypothesis 2b over 2a. 




membership, higher ratio of unused commitments, being publicly traded, having positive changes in the 
local market conditions where they operate as proxied by the coincident index and house price inflation, 
and a lower loan concentration are more likely to have strong profit performance during subsequent 
financial crises.  
7. Robustness Checks  
This section presents our robustness checks. In all cases, we use only the full specifications with both cost 
and profit efficiency and the broad set of controls, although most of the controls are not shown for brevity. 
7.1. Effects for Banking Crises and Market Crises 
We examine whether results differ for the two banking crises versus the three market crises in our sample. 
Table 5 shows the results. They suggest that all of our effects of cost efficiency on bank performance hold 
consistently during banking crises, and hold in only some cases during market crises. Our non-results for 
profit efficiency occur in almost all cases for both types of crises. 
7.2. Excluding Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) Banks 
Another issue is that our results may be driven by the very large banks considered too-big-to-fail (TBTF), 
and more likely to be bailed out in the event of problems. To mitigate this concern, we rerun our main 
analyses while excluding these banks. There is no formal definition of TBTF, so we use two alternative 
definitions. First, in every period, we deem all banks with GTA of at least $50 billion to be TBTF, consistent 
with the Dodd-Frank Act definition of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Second, we 
classify the 19 largest institutions in each period as TBTF, consistent with the Federal Reserve’s 
determination in 2009 that the 19 largest banks were subject to stress tests. Table 6 shows results 
alternatively excluding these two groups. We find similar results to our main findings, suggesting that our 
conclusions are not driven by the TBTF banks.21 
 




7.4. Controlling for Cost-to-Income 
To ensure robustness, we also replicate our results when controlling for a simpler measure of efficiency 
used in the literature – COST-TO-INCOME, or total bank costs relative to total revenues (e.g., Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Merrouche, 2013). We also separately control for COST-TO-INCOME RANK, 
computed analogously to our efficiency ranks. These results are reported in Table 7 and show that these 
additional variables are either marginally statistically significant or insignificant, while our main results 
remain qualitatively unaffected. 
7.5. Alternative Pre-Crisis Period 
Our main results are based on regressions that use efficiencies and control variables computed over all time 
periods between crises. Using the most data reduces sensitivity to the effects of outliers. As robustness 
checks, we rerun our regressions while measuring efficiency and control variables averaged over the four 
quarters before a crisis. These results are reported in Table 8 and show results similar to the main results.22  
7.6. Effects by Bank Size 
Prior banking research has inconclusive results on the relations between bank size and efficiency. Some 
studies find that large banks achieve more cost and profit efficiencies than small banks (Tecles and Tabak, 
2010; Manlagnit, 2011), while others find that small banks achieve more profit efficiency than large banks 
(e.g., Mamatzakis, Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, 2008). To account for the fact that effects of 
efficiency may be different for small banks (GTA ≤ $1 billion) and large banks (GTA > 1 billion), we rerun 
our analyses for these two bank size classes. 
Table 9 shows the effects of efficiency on bank performance during financial crises for small banks 
and large banks. Results suggest that our main findings hold for both small and large banks, but the 
magnitudes of the coefficients are generally higher for the large banks, although the t-statistics and 
 




statistically significance are generally greater for small banks, likely due to the much larger numbers of 
observations.23  
7.7. Non-Monotonicity of the Effects 
In Table 10, we rerun our tests, including quadratic terms of our cost and profit efficiency measures, 
COSTEFF_SQ and PROFITEFF_SQ, respectively, to account for the possibility of nonlinear relations 
between bank efficiency pre-crisis and performance during crises. The coefficients on the linear terms for 
COSTEFF are all statistically significant and of the same sign as in our main specification, while the 
coefficients on the quadratic terms COSTEFF_SQ have opposing signs and are also statistically significant, 
consistent with the existence of U- or upside-down U-shaped relations.  
We calculate the inflection points of the quadratic functions of cost and profit efficiency for each 
performance indicator and determine the percent of observations for which the findings run in the same 
direction as our main results. For the cost efficiency, the inflection points are 0.739 and 0.782 for the failure 
models, 0.856 and 0.896 for the risk models, and 0.807 and 1.952 for the profitability models.24 We also 
report the percent of observations for which the main relation holds. We find that for all six dependent 
variables, the effects of cost efficiency go in the same direction as in our main analyses for more than 90% 
of the observations. Thus, the data are consistent with our conclusions that higher cost efficiency results in 
improved bank performance during financial crises. As in our main analysis, profit efficiency during normal 
times has no consistent effects on bank performance during subsequent financial crises. 
8. Deeper Analysis of the Cost Efficiency Findings 
Our results so far suggest that cost efficiency during normal times helps banks perform better during 
subsequent financial crises, consistent with the good management channel underlying Hypothesis 1a. We 
next examine more carefully the extent to which this channel explains the data and whether or not the 
 
23 In unreported results, we redefine small and large banks based on the median of bank GTA and results are 
qualitatively similar. 




alternative skimping channel may find any support.  
To do so, we first test whether the cost efficiency-performance relations are stronger for well 
managed versus poorly managed banks using regulatory enforcement actions against bank management 
data in the pre-crisis period to proxy for management quality following the extant research (e.g., Duchin 
and Sosyura, 2014; Fiordelisi, Raponi, and Rau, 2015; Delis, Staikouras, and Tsoumas, 2016). Banking 
regulators issue formal, publicly announced enforcement actions against bank management officials if these 
individuals are found to engage in unsafe, unsound, or illegal banking practices,25 or other significant 
violations of laws, rules, or regulations. Information on regulatory enforcement actions against management 
is acquired via manual collection from the federal regulators OCC, FDIC, and FRS. We group banks 
according to whether they did not or did receive enforcement actions against management in the pre-crisis 
period, Enforcement Actions against Management = 0 or Enforcement Actions against Management > 0, 
and estimate the model for both subsamples. To the extent that the good management channel is in effect, 
it is expected that cost efficiency would have its most favorable effects for the better-managed banks that 
have no enforcement actions. 
Regression estimates testing this are shown in Table 11, columns (1) through (12), where we show 
the full specifications for the performance measures for the subsamples of banks without and with 
enforcement actions. The effects of cost efficiency are statistically significant in all cases for the banks 
without enforcement actions. In contrast, they are insignificant in all cases and have the opposing signs for 
failure and profitability for banks with enforcement actions.    
Results for the banks without enforcement actions are also economically significant. For these 
banks, moving cost efficiency during normal times from 0 to 1 decreases the probability of bank failure 
during financial crises by 64% (from 0.028 to 0.010) in Column (1) for FAILED1 and 96% (from 0.045 to 
0.002) in Column (6) for FAILED2. Similarly, looking at bank risk for banks without enforcement actions, 
 
25 Unsafe or unsound practices are any actions or omissions which are contrary to generally accepted standards of 





we find that moving cost efficiency during normal times from 0 to 1 increases LN(ΖSCORE) during 
financial crises by 8.5% (from 3.07 to 3.33) in Column (5), and reduces σROA by 22% (from 0.009 to 0.007) 
in Column (6). Finally, we find that moving normal-times cost efficiency from 0 to 1 for banks without 
actions increases ROA during financial crises by 75% (from 0.004 to 0.007) in Column (9), and increases 
ROE during financial crises by 51% (from 0.047 to 0.071) in Column (10). The results are strongly 
consistent with the good management channel – the effects of normal-times cost efficiency on subsequent 
financial crisis performance are only favorable and statistically and economically significant for the banks 
with no enforcement actions against management. 
Table 11 columns (13) – (14) provide direct tests of the skimping channel by examining whether 
high cost efficiency during normal times is associated with more loan performance problems during 
subsequent financial crises. To measure loan performance problems, we use the ratio of nonperforming 
loans (past due at least 90 days or in nonaccrual status) to total loans, NPL, , and the the ratio of the loan 
and lease loss allowance to total loans, LLA . The evidence does not support the skimping channel – cost 
efficiency is instead associated with fewer loan performance problems.26 
9. Conclusions  
We test the effects of bank efficiency in normal times on bank performance during subsequent financial 
crises. We find that cost efficiency during normal times helps banks reduce failure probabilities, decrease 
risk, and enhance profitability during subsequent financial crises, while profit efficiency has limited 
benefits. This suggests that cost efficiency may better proxy management quality, while profit efficiency 
may partially reflect temporary high returns during normal times from risky investments that are reversed 
during subsequent financial crises. Results are robust to various checks. A deeper analysis confirms that 
high cost efficiency is associated with good management.  
 
26 In unreported results, we rerun tests for small banks (GTA ≤ $1 billion) and large banks (GTA > $1 billion) and 
find that both small and large banks with higher cost efficiency in the pre-crisis period experience fewer loan 




These results also yield important potential policy and research implications. Our findings suggest 
that bank stakeholders – policymakers, regulators, supervisors, owners, creditors, and managers – may 
consider closer monitoring of banks with low cost efficiency early so as to reduce the occurrence of 
problems during future financial crises. In addition, bank managers may consider policies and procedures 
that promote cost efficiency, which may drive better bank performance during subsequent crises.  With 
respect to research implications, our findings suggest that researchers consider relying more on cost 
efficiency as an indicator of bank quality than profit efficiency. The results also suggest that future research 
focus more on intertemporal issues in banking – what happens during normal times has important 
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Figure 1: Timeline  
This figure shows the banking crises (BNKCRISIS), market crises (MKTCRISIS), and normal times (NORMAL) that occurred during our sample period 












    
Period Type Exact time period 
NORMAL 86:Q1 - 87:Q3 
MKT_CRISIS 87:Q4 
NORMAL 88:Q1 - 89:Q4 
BNK_CRISIS 90:Q1 - 92:Q4 
NORMAL 93:Q1 - 98:Q2 
MKT_CRISIS 98:Q3 - 98:Q4 
NORMAL 99:Q1 - 00:Q1 
MKT_CRISIS 00:Q2 - 02:Q3 
NORMAL 02:Q4 - 07:Q2 













NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL 





Table 1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Panel A provides definitions for all variables used in our analysis. Panel B reports summary statistics of the variables 
for our analysis for the period 1986:Q1-2009:Q4. All variables using dollar amounts are expressed in real 2009:Q4 
dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator. It contains means, medians, standard deviations and number of 
observations on all the regression variables used to examine the effect of pre-crisis cost and profit efficiency on banks’ 
ability to survive crises, reduce risk, and increase their performance during such crises. We first present statistics for 
all financial crises, and then we distinguish between banking crises (the credit crunch of the early 1990s and the recent 
subprime lending crisis), and market crises (the 1987 stock market crash, the Russian debt crisis plus LTCM bailout 
in 1998, and the bursting of the dot.com bubble plus September 11).  
 




FAILED1 is a dummy equal to one if bank i failed as it was placed under receivership or closed by the FDIC 
given it was unable to meet its obligations to depositors and other stakeholders and thus it was included in 
the FDIC failure list, or experienced book-value insolvency or technical default (bank became critically 
undercapitalized, its equity capitalization fell below 2% of bank GTA. 
FAILED2 is a dummy equal to one if bank i failed as it was placed under receivership or closed by the FDIC 
given it was unable to meet its obligations to depositors and other stakeholders and thus it was included in 
the FDIC failure list. 
RISK 
LN(ΖSCORE) is a measure of bank financial risk. It is calculated as the log of the sum of a bank’s mean 
ROA (net income over GTA) and mean CAPITAL RATIO (equity capital over GTA) divided by σROA (the 
volatility of ROA), where the means of the components are calculated over the crises periods.  
σROA is the volatility of return on assets ROA over the crises periods.  
PROFITABILITY 
ROA is the bank return on assets over the crises periods.  
ROE is the bank return on equity over the crises periods winsorized at the 1% level.  
OTHER DEPENDENT VARIABLES (Robustness) 
NPL/TL is the bank ratio of nonperforming loans (past due at least 90 days or in nonaccrual status) to total 
loans. 
LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA.  
Key Independent Variables 
COSTEFF is bank cost efficiency over the pre-crisis periods.  
PROFFEFF is bank profit efficiency over the pre-crisis periods.  
Basic Characteristics 
COST EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of quarters in which the cost function residual ranks improved 
over the normal times period.  
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of quarters in which the profit function residual ranks 
improved over the normal times period.  
Other Bank Characteristics 
A. Risk and Opacity 
CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the bank’s total equity divided by GTA.  




COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real estate loans divided by GTA.  
BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO is brokered deposits divided by GTA.  
Other Bank Characteristics (cont.) 
A. Risk and Opacity (cont.) 
UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO is unused commitments divided by GTA.  
CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is cash holdings divided by GTA. 
LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA.  
LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s loan portfolio concentration measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: commercial real estate, residential real estate, construction 
and industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans.  
B. Size and Safety Net Protection 
LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the natural log of GTA.  
SUPERVISOR_OCC is a dummy equal 1 if the OCC is the primary supervisor of the bank. 
SUPERVISOR_FDIC is a dummy equal 1 if the FDIC is the primary supervisor of the bank. 
SUPERVISOR_FRS is a dummy equal 1 if the FRS is the primary supervisor of the bank.  
C. Bank Ownership 
BHC MEMBER is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank was part of a bank holding company (BHC) 
at any time in the pre-crisis period.  
PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed on a stock 
exchange.  
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership.  
D. Organizational Structure 
BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank organizational complexity calculated as (ratio of the number of 
branches the bank has active over GTA) × 1000.  
LN (NUMBER STATES) is the log of the number of states in which bank has branches.  
E. Competition 
HHI DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of deposit concentration for the local 
markets in which the bank is present.  
PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and 
CBSAs) as a fraction of deposits in all markets in which a bank is active.  
F. Local Economic Conditions 
CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal 
Reserve’s state coincident indexes with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights.  
HOUSE PRICE INFLATION is the weighted average growth in a state-level house price index with the 
share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights.  
G. Other Variables (Robustness) 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS are a set of individual crisis dummies, which act as time fixed effects. 
Enforcement Actions against Management is the number of regulatory enforcement actions against bank 
management by the corresponding banking regulator (Federal Reserve System (FRS), Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)) during the time period. 




COST-TO-INCOME RANK is the rank of the ratio of bank total costs to total revenue in descending order 




Panel B – Summary Statistics 
  ALL FINANCIAL CRISES BANKING CRISES MARKET CRISES 
Summary Statistics mean p50 sd N mean p50 sd N mean p50 sd N 
Dependent Crisis Variables                         
FAILURE             
FAILED1 0.017 0.000 0.128 48,532 0.030 0.000 0.170 19,066 0.008 0.000 0.091 29,466 
FAILED2 0.008 0.000 0.089 48,532 0.019 0.000 0.138 19,066 0.001 0.000 0.023 29,466 
RISK             
LN(ΖSCORE) 3.200 3.332 1.368 35,150 2.768 3.021 1.387 18,990 3.708 3.699 1.153 16,160 
σROA 0.008 0.004 0.015 35,151 0.010 0.005 0.019 18,990 0.005 0.003 0.009 16,160 
PROFITABILITY 
ROA 0.005 0.009 0.020 48,532 0.005 0.009 0.015 19,066 0.005 0.010 0.023 29,466 
ROE 0.059 0.097 0.183 48,532 0.060 0.093 0.142 19,066 0.059 0.100 0.205 29,466 
OTHER DEPENDENT VARIABLES (Robustness) 
NPL/TL  0.019 0.011 0.025 48,532 0.021 0.015 0.024 19,066 0.018 0.009 0.256 29,466 
LLA/GTA 0.009 0.008 0.006 48,532 0.010 0.009 0.006 19,066 0.009 0.008 0.006 29,466 
Independent Pre-Crisis Variables                         
Key Independent Variables             
COSTEFF 0.500 0.495 0.173 48,532 0.505 0.502 0.169 19,066 0.497 0.491 0.175 29,466 
PROFITEFF 0.498 0.507 0.282 48,532 0.504 0.516 0.282 19,066 0.495 0.501 0.281 29,466 
Basic Characteristics             
COST EFF MOMENTUM 0.596 0.500 0.535 48,532 0.781 0.579 0.747 19,066 0.475 0.429 0.273 29,466 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM 0.591 0.421 0.744 48,532 0.770 0.500 1.020 19,066 0.475 0.400 0.452 29,466 
Other Bank Characteristics             
A. Risk and Opacity             
CAPITAL RATIO 0.101 0.088 0.055 48,532 0.103 0.088 0.061 19,066 0.099 0.088 0.050 29,466 
TOTAL LOANS / GTA 0.557 0.573 0.148 48,532 0.566 0.580 0.156 19,066 0.552 0.569 0.142 29,466 
COMMERCIAL RE RATIO  0.146 0.120 0.111 48,532 0.165 0.131 0.130 19,066 0.133 0.115 0.094 29,466 
BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO 0.007 0.000 0.042 48,532 0.011 0.000 0.060 19,066 0.004 0.000 0.025 29,466 
UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO 0.075 0.041 0.662 48,532 0.075 0.042 0.436 19,066 0.075 0.041 0.774 29,466 
CASH HOLDINGS RATIO 0.070 0.053 0.056 48,532 0.070 0.054 0.057 19,066 0.069 0.052 0.055 29,466 
LLA / GTA 0.009 0.008 0.005 48,532 0.009 0.008 0.005 19,066 0.008 0.008 0.005 29,466 
LOAN CONCENTRATION 0.316 0.290 0.099 48,532 0.325 0.296 0.106 19,066 0.310 0.287 0.093 29,466 
B. Size and Safety Net Protection             
LN(GTA) 11.454 11.308 1.243 48,532 11.504 11.352 1.270 19,066 11.422 11.279 1.224 29,466 
SUPERVISOR OCC 0.297 0.000 0.454 48,532 0.289 0.000 0.451 19,066 0.302 0.000 0.457 29,466 
SUPERVISOR FDIC 0.609 1.000 0.485 48,532 0.617 1.000 0.483 19,066 0.604 1.000 0.486 29,466 
SUPERVISOR FRS 0.094 0.000 0.288 48,532 0.094 0.000 0.289 19,066 0.094 0.000 0.287 29,466 
C. Bank Ownership             
BHC MEMBER 0.721 1.000 0.436 48,532 0.728 1.000 0.433 19,066 0.716 1.000 0.437 29,466 
PUBLICLY LISTED 0.115 0.000 0.309 48,532 0.120 0.000 0.317 19,066 0.112 0.000 0.304 29,466 
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 0.009 0.000 0.088 48,532 0.008 0.000 0.084 19,066 0.009 0.000 0.090 29,466 
D. Organizational Structure             
BRANCHES / GTA 0.030 0.024 0.024 48,532 0.030 0.024 0.024 19,066 0.030 0.024 0.023 29,466 
LN (NUMBER STATES) 0.012 0.000 0.107 48,532 0.017 0.000 0.131 19,066 0.008 0.000 0.089 29,466 
E. Competition             
HHI DEPOSITS 0.086 0.059 0.087 48,532 0.092 0.073 0.086 19,066 0.083 0.052 0.087 29,466 
PERCENT METROPOLITAN 0.466 0.204 0.477 48,532 0.505 0.526 0.465 19,066 0.440 0.000 0.483 29,466 
F. Local Economic Conditions             
CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX 0.206 0.272 0.544 48,532 -0.008 0.041 0.276 19,066 0.345 0.514 0.624 29,466 
HOUSE PRICE INFLATION 0.426 0.450 1.006 48,532 0.313 0.281 0.934 19,066 0.499 0.570 1.044 29,466 
G. Other Variables (Robustness)             
Enforcement Actions against 
Management 0.056 0.000 1.594 48,532 0.087 0.000 2.471 19,066 0.035 0.000 0.483 29,466 
COST-TO-INCOME 3.949 5.962 425.725 48,532 7.116 6.265 204.696 19,066 1.901 5.805 520.957 29,466 




Table 2: Do Cost and Profit Efficiency Protect Banks from Failing during Financial Crises? – Main Results 
(All Crises) 
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing whether cost and profit efficiency protect banks from failure during 
financial crises. Panel A presents the estimates using minimal controls, while Panel B presents the results using all controls. The 
dependent variables are FAILED1 and FAILED2. FAILED1 is a dummy equal to 1 during a crisis if the bank failed anytime during the 
crisis or of the bank became insolvent (capitalization ratio is less or equal to 2%). FAILED2 is a dummy equal to 1 during a crisis if the 
bank failed anytime during the crisis. All independent variables are measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. The key explanatory 
variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and profit efficiency PROFITEFF. COST EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of cost efficiency 
increases. PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of profit efficiency increases. LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the natural 
log of GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the bank’s total equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the ratio 
of total loans to GTA. BHC MEMBER is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at any time in the pre-crisis 
period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real estate loans divided by GTA. SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC 
are dummies that equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC are the primary supervisor of the bank, respectively; both dummies are used in regressions 
(left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRSS). FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership. 
BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO is brokered deposits divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO is unused commitments 
divided by GTA. CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is cash holdings divided by GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI 
DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank is 
present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) as a fraction of 
deposits in all markets in which a bank is active. BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank organizational complexity calculated as (ratio 
of the number of branches the bank has active over GTA) x 1000. LN (NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in 
which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed on a stock 
exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state coincident 
indexes with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE INFLATION is the weighted average growth in 
a state-level house price index with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s 
loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: commercial real 
estate, residential real estate, construction and industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
Panel A – Failure with Minimal Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable FAILED1 FAILED2 FAILED1 FAILED2 FAILED1 FAILED2 
Independent Variables & Regression Method LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics           
COSTEFF -1.424*** -2.990***     -1.388*** -2.912*** 
  (-4.984) (-7.270)     (-4.872) (-7.114) 
PROFITEFF     -0.308 -0.614** -0.193 -0.351 
      (-1.500) (-2.075) (-0.931) (-1.146) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM -0.903*** -1.782*** -0.490*** -0.797*** -0.863*** -1.703*** 
  (-7.974) (-12.623) (-6.833) (-9.116) (-7.730) (-12.652) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM -0.158*** -0.345*** -0.332*** -0.712*** -0.225*** -0.494*** 
  (-2.928) (-3.906) (-4.126) (-5.913) (-2.616) (-3.533) 
CONSTANT -1.887*** -1.009*** -2.635*** -2.612*** -1.791*** -0.834** 
  (-9.159) (-3.726) (-16.629) (-11.976) (-7.510) (-2.542) 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 48,532 40,067 48,532 40,067 48,532 40,067 
PSEUDO R2 0.0830 0.144 0.0803 0.135 0.0831 0.145 
 
Panel B – Failure with All Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable FAILED1 FAILED2 FAILED1 FAILED2 FAILED1 FAILED2 
Independent Variables & Regression Method LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics             
COSTEFF -1.273*** -3.557***     -1.183*** -3.367*** 
  (-3.751) (-7.263)     (-3.526) (-6.853) 
PROFITEFF     -0.492** -1.001*** -0.370 -0.645* 
      (-2.121) (-3.192) (-1.576) (-1.906) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM -0.889*** -2.147*** -0.468*** -0.820*** -0.803*** -1.983*** 
  (-6.306) (-10.553) (-5.297) (-7.785) (-5.757) (-10.063) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM -0.154*** -0.301*** -0.386*** -0.844*** -0.287*** -0.590*** 
  (-2.581) (-3.198) (-4.014) (-5.813) (-2.820) (-3.395) 
Other Bank Characteristics:             




CAPITAL RATIO -21.894*** -8.374*** -22.063*** -8.633*** -21.883*** -8.440*** 
  (-5.690) (-3.641) (-5.751) (-3.661) (-5.705) (-3.677) 
TOTAL LOANS / GTA 2.878*** 2.446*** 2.920*** 2.461*** 2.884*** 2.466*** 
  (6.513) (4.461) (6.605) (4.488) (6.521) (4.489) 
COMMERCIAL RE RATIO 3.061*** 3.787*** 3.051*** 3.703*** 3.071*** 3.782*** 
 (8.571) (8.185) (8.563) (8.147) (8.603) (8.214) 
BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO 1.770 1.034* 1.793 1.005* 1.829 1.017* 
  (0.640) (1.858) (0.644) (1.880) (0.650) (1.704) 
UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO 0.069* 0.046* 0.069* 0.043* 0.070** 0.049** 
  (1.937) (1.937) (1.837) (1.650) (1.988) (2.069) 
CASH HOLDINGS RATIO 0.014 -0.478 0.072 -0.365 -0.004 -0.527 
  (0.017) (-0.382) (0.087) (-0.286) (-0.004) (-0.419) 
LLA / GTA 66.413*** 39.092*** 66.501*** 39.884*** 66.185*** 38.881*** 
  (8.312) (4.847) (8.400) (4.769) (8.283) (4.881) 
LOAN CONCENTRATION 2.897*** 3.292*** 2.901*** 3.357*** 2.878*** 3.276*** 
  (7.079) (7.575) (7.069) (7.879) (6.979) (7.568) 
B. Size and Safety Net Protection             
LN(GTA) -0.247*** -0.099 -0.250*** -0.101 -0.250*** -0.107 
  (-4.361) (-1.324) (-4.402) (-1.349) (-4.407) (-1.410) 
SUPERVISOR OCC 0.109 0.043 0.111 0.039 0.112 0.048 
  (0.739) (0.221) (0.747) (0.197) (0.753) (0.243) 
SUPERVISOR FDIC -0.181 -0.177 -0.181 -0.179 -0.181 -0.175 
  (-1.261) (-0.962) (-1.265) (-0.966) (-1.261) (-0.948) 
C. Bank Ownership             
BHC MEMBER -0.563*** -0.526*** -0.555*** -0.483*** -0.565*** -0.528*** 
  (-6.369) (-4.135) (-6.285) (-3.832) (-6.387) (-4.148) 
PUBLICLY LISTED -1.027*** -1.273*** -1.019*** -1.256*** -1.025*** -1.268*** 
  (-6.070) (-6.053) (-6.034) (-5.978) (-6.063) (-6.046) 
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP -0.556 -0.680 -0.560 -0.621 -0.562 -0.685 
  (-0.919) (-0.995) (-0.908) (-0.891) (-0.929) (-1.001) 
D. Organizational Structure             
BRANCHES / GTA -3.492 -4.834 -3.540 -4.466 -3.664 -5.231 
  (-1.336) (-1.222) (-1.350) (-1.133) (-1.398) (-1.301) 
LN (NUMBER STATES) 1.437*** 1.571*** 1.412*** 1.534*** 1.429*** 1.568*** 
  (4.388) (4.953) (4.302) (4.862) (4.347) (4.915) 
E. Competition             
HHI DEPOSITS 1.106** 2.238*** 1.081** 2.259*** 1.102** 2.251*** 
  (2.249) (3.606) (2.174) (3.575) (2.239) (3.623) 
PERCENT METROPOLITAN 0.623*** 0.570*** 0.638*** 0.592*** 0.627*** 0.576*** 
  (5.889) (3.620) (6.024) (3.755) (5.922) (3.666) 
F. Local Economic Conditions             
CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX -0.718*** -1.310*** -0.714*** -1.347*** -0.719*** -1.315*** 
  (-7.402) (-6.828) (-7.404) (-7.017) (-7.419) (-6.855) 
HOUSE PRICE INFLATION -0.183*** -0.155** -0.184*** -0.144** -0.183*** -0.153** 
  (-3.289) (-2.225) (-3.317) (-2.095) (-3.296) (-2.201) 
CONSTANT -0.917 -1.843* -1.450 -3.668*** -0.697 -1.458 
  (-1.021) (-1.716) (-1.610) (-3.509) (-0.749) (-1.313) 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 48,532 40,067 48,532 40,067 48,532 40,067 






Table 3 - How Do Cost and Profit Efficiency during Normal Times Impact Bank Risk During Financial 
Crises? (All Crises)  
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing how does cost and profit efficiency during normal times impact 
bank risk during financial crises. Panel A presents the estimates using minimal controls, while Panel B presents the results using all 
controls. The dependent variables are as follows: LN(ΖSCORE) is the log of the sum of a bank’s mean ROA (net income over GTA) and 
mean CAPITAL RATIO (equity capital over GTA) divided by σROA (the volatility of ROA), where the means of the components are 
calculated over the crises periods. σROA is the volatility of return on assets ROA over the crises periods. All independent variables are 
measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. The key explanatory variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and profit efficiency 
PROFITEFF. COST EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of cost efficiency increases. PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of 
profit efficiency increases. LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the natural log of GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined 
as the bank’s total equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the ratio of total loans to GTA. BHC MEMBER is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at any time in the pre-crisis period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real 
estate loans divided by GTA. SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC are dummies that equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC are the 
primary supervisor of the bank, respectively; both dummies are used in regressions (left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRS). FOREIGN 
OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership. BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO is brokered deposits 
divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO is unused commitments divided by GTA. CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is cash 
holdings divided by GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank is present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the percentage 
of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) as a fraction of deposits in all markets a bank is active. BRANCHES / 
GTA is a measure of bank organizational complexity calculated as (ratio of the number of branches the bank has active over GTA) x 
1000. LN (NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy 
equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed on a stock exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the weighted 
average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state coincident indexes with the share of the deposits of a given bank 
taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE INFLATION is the weighted average growth in a state-level house price index with the share of the 
deposits of a given bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s loan portfolio concentration is measured as a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: commercial real estate, residential real estate, construction and 
industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
Panel A – Risk with Minimal Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable LN(ZSCORE) σROA LN(ZSCORE) σROA LN(ZSCORE) σROA 
Independent Variables & Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics           
COSTEFF 0.309*** -0.003***     0.319*** -0.003*** 
  (5.596) (-4.009)     (5.786) (-4.128) 
PROFITEFF     -0.063 0.000 -0.082** 0.000 
      (-1.616) (0.624) (-2.103) (0.984) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM 0.165*** -0.001*** 0.110*** -0.001*** 0.178*** -0.002*** 
  (10.595) (-7.866) (8.549) (-7.295) (11.252) (-8.498) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM 0.043*** -0.000*** 0.041*** -0.000*** 0.020* -0.000** 
  (4.928) (-4.500) (3.484) (-3.417) (1.695) (-2.060) 
CONSTANT 2.444*** 0.012*** 2.685*** 0.010*** 2.488*** 0.012*** 
  (56.413) (21.400) (82.107) (24.117) (50.401) (17.962) 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 35,150 35,151 35,150 35,151 35,150 35,151 
ADJ. R2 0.141 0.041 0.140 0.041 0.141 0.041 
 
Panel B – Risk with All Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable LN(ZSCORE) σROA LN(ZSCORE) σROA LN(ZSCORE) σROA 
Independent Variables & Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics             
COSTEFF 0.249*** -0.003***     0.256*** -0.003*** 
  (4.703) (-3.987)     (4.834) (-3.938) 
PROFITEFF     -0.040 -0.001 -0.054 -0.000 
      (-1.038) (-1.386) (-1.421) (-1.085) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM 0.145*** -0.001*** 0.099*** -0.001*** 0.154*** -0.001*** 
  (9.878) (-7.452) (8.178) (-5.665) (10.275) (-7.229) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM 0.033*** -0.000 0.034*** -0.000*** 0.017 -0.000** 
  (3.998) (-1.496) (3.084) (-3.435) (1.584) (-2.161) 




A. Risk and Opacity             
CAPITAL RATIO 1.135*** 0.018*** 1.175*** 0.018*** 1.148*** 0.019*** 
  (8.169) (9.276) (8.463) (9.141) (8.264) (9.276) 
TOTAL LOANS / GTA -0.392*** 0.002*** -0.393*** 0.002*** -0.391*** 0.002*** 
  (-5.526) (2.766) (-5.543) (2.788) (-5.520) (2.771) 
COMMERCIAL RE RATIO -1.091*** 0.010*** -1.085*** 0.010*** -1.087*** 0.010*** 
 (-11.365) (6.633) (-11.309) (6.631) (-11.334) (6.649) 
BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO -2.012** 0.021* -2.002** 0.021* -2.010** 0.021* 
  (-2.006) (1.947) (-2.010) (1.945) (-2.008) (1.943) 
UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO -0.012 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.012 0.000 
  (-1.118) (0.669) (-1.094) (0.666) (-1.105) (0.677) 
CASH HOLDINGS RATIO -1.063*** 0.003* -1.078*** 0.003* -1.064*** 0.003* 
  (-6.827) (1.661) (-6.916) (1.750) (-6.827) (1.659) 
LLA / GTA -28.796*** 0.329*** -28.924*** 0.330*** -28.844*** 0.329*** 
  (-12.745) (9.316) (-12.749) (9.311) (-12.741) (9.302) 
LOAN CONCENTRATION -0.955*** 0.016*** -0.962*** 0.016*** -0.955*** 0.016*** 
  (-9.043) (10.616) (-9.143) (10.662) (-9.053) (10.610) 
B. Size and Safety Net Protection             
LN(GTA) 0.137*** -0.001*** 0.137*** -0.001*** 0.137*** -0.001*** 
  (14.037) (-7.903) (14.006) (-7.944) (13.975) (-7.915) 
SUPERVISOR OCC -0.048* 0.000 -0.048* 0.000 -0.048* 0.000 
  (-1.760) (0.215) (-1.757) (0.238) (-1.745) (0.226) 
SUPERVISOR FDIC -0.009 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 
  (-0.352) (-1.561) (-0.318) (-1.578) (-0.347) (-1.558) 
C. Bank Ownership             
BHC MEMBER 0.122*** -0.001*** 0.121*** -0.001*** 0.122*** -0.001*** 
  (6.390) (-4.698) (6.348) (-4.677) (6.380) (-4.704) 
PUBLICLY LISTED 0.074*** 0.000 0.071*** 0.000 0.074*** 0.000 
  (2.852) (0.947) (2.714) (1.044) (2.837) (0.935) 
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP -0.356*** 0.004*** -0.355*** 0.004*** -0.357*** 0.004*** 
  (-3.549) (2.796) (-3.536) (2.783) (-3.554) (2.792) 
D. Organizational Structure             
BRANCHES / GTA -2.308*** 0.001 -2.341*** 0.001 -2.331*** 0.001 
  (-5.579) (0.215) (-5.653) (0.190) (-5.641) (0.167) 
LN (NUMBER STATES) -0.550*** 0.004*** -0.547*** 0.004*** -0.550*** 0.004*** 
  (-9.297) (4.605) (-9.251) (4.581) (-9.279) (4.609) 
E. Competition             
HHI DEPOSITS -0.342*** 0.003*** -0.342*** 0.003*** -0.343*** 0.003*** 
  (-3.300) (2.723) (-3.301) (2.716) (-3.303) (2.720) 
PERCENT METROPOLITAN -0.187*** 0.001*** -0.188*** 0.001*** -0.186*** 0.001*** 
  (-9.179) (3.738) (-9.245) (3.843) (-9.153) (3.756) 
F. Local Economic Conditions             
CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX 0.369*** -0.003*** 0.367*** -0.003*** 0.370*** -0.003*** 
  (10.502) (-6.678) (10.451) (-6.634) (10.516) (-6.674) 
HOUSE PRICE INFLATION -0.001 0.001*** -0.001 0.001*** -0.001 0.001*** 
  (-0.079) (3.394) (-0.074) (3.397) (-0.075) (3.399) 
CONSTANT 1.887*** 0.010*** 2.078*** 0.008*** 1.920*** 0.010*** 
  (13.454) (6.027) (14.919) (5.347) (13.330) (6.006) 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 35,150 35,151 35,150 35,151 35,150 35,151 







Table 4 - How Do Cost and Profit Efficiency during Normal Times Impact Bank Profitability during 
Financial Crises? (All Crises)  
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing how does cost and profit efficiency during normal times impact 
bank profitability during financial crises. Panel A presents the estimates using minimal controls, while Panel B presents the results using 
all controls. The dependent variables are as follows: ROA is the bank return on assets over the crises periods. ROE is the bank return on 
equity over the crises periods. All independent variables are measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. The key explanatory 
variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and profit efficiency PROFITEFF. COST EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of cost efficiency 
increases. PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of profit efficiency increases. LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the natural 
log of GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the bank’s total equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the ratio 
of total loans to GTA. BHC MEMBER is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at any time in the pre-crisis 
period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real estate loans divided by GTA. SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC 
are dummies that equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC are the primary supervisor of the bank, respectively; both dummies are used in regressions 
(left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRS). FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership. 
BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO is brokered deposits divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO is unused commitments 
divided by GTA. CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is cash holdings divided by GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI 
DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank is 
present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) as a fraction of 
deposits in all markets in which a bank is active. BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank organizational complexity calculated as (ratio 
of the number of branches the bank has active over GTA) x 1000. LN (NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in 
which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed on a stock 
exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state coincident 
indexes with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE INFLATION is the weighted average growth in 
a state-level house price index with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s 
loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: commercial real 
estate, residential real estate, construction and industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
Panel A – Profitability with Minimal Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Independent Variables & Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics           
COSTEFF 0.002*** 0.019***     0.002*** 0.020*** 
  (3.176) (2.961)     (3.415) (3.209) 
PROFITEFF     -0.001*** -0.012*** -0.002*** -0.014*** 
      (-2.694) (-2.800) (-2.964) (-3.067) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM 0.002*** 0.015*** 0.001*** 0.013*** 0.002*** 0.018*** 
  (9.337) (9.572) (8.897) (8.894) (10.535) (10.775) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.000** 0.003** 
  (7.914) (7.392) (3.836) (3.692) (2.499) (2.503) 
CONSTANT 0.004*** 0.049*** 0.006*** 0.069*** 0.004*** 0.056*** 
  (6.698) (10.432) (14.897) (19.837) (7.291) (10.609) 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 48,532 48,532 48,532 48,532 48,532 48,532 
ADJ. R2 0.047 0.060 0.047 0.060 0.047 0.060 
 
Panel B – Profitability with All Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Independent Variables & Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics             
COSTEFF 0.002*** 0.023***     0.002*** 0.024*** 
  (3.614) (3.982)     (3.745) (4.108) 
PROFITEFF     -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 
      (-1.339) (-1.225) (-1.626) (-1.558) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM 0.001*** 0.014*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.015*** 
  (8.541) (9.458) (6.676) (7.071) (9.132) (9.940) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000** 0.003*** 
  (5.552) (5.557) (3.670) (4.191) (2.262) (2.717) 
Other Bank Characteristics:             




CAPITAL RATIO -0.023*** -0.218*** -0.023*** -0.215*** -0.023*** -0.217*** 
  (-7.056) (-12.955) (-6.924) (-12.747) (-6.980) (-12.858) 
TOTAL LOANS / GTA -0.007*** -0.045*** -0.007*** -0.045*** -0.007*** -0.045*** 
  (-7.045) (-5.666) (-7.047) (-5.674) (-7.035) (-5.658) 
COMMERCIAL RE RATIO -0.013*** -0.118*** -0.013*** -0.117*** -0.013*** -0.117*** 
 (-9.419) (-10.246) (-9.384) (-10.198) (-9.403) (-10.220) 
BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO -0.021** -0.187** -0.021** -0.187** -0.021** -0.187** 
  (-1.967) (-2.011) (-1.971) (-2.016) (-1.970) (-2.014) 
UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO 0.000** 0.002** 0.000** 0.002** 0.000** 0.002** 
  (2.428) (2.523) (2.470) (2.566) (2.446) (2.540) 
CASH HOLDINGS RATIO -0.003* -0.024 -0.003* -0.025 -0.003* -0.024 
  (-1.650) (-1.386) (-1.699) (-1.434) (-1.648) (-1.384) 
LLA / GTA -0.233*** -3.525*** -0.234*** -3.535*** -0.234*** -3.529*** 
  (-4.698) (-10.210) (-4.723) (-10.235) (-4.712) (-10.222) 
LOAN CONCENTRATION -0.007*** -0.075*** -0.007*** -0.076*** -0.007*** -0.075*** 
  (-5.177) (-6.682) (-5.234) (-6.757) (-5.183) (-6.690) 
B. Size and Safety Net Protection             
LN(GTA) 0.001*** 0.013*** 0.001*** 0.013*** 0.001*** 0.013*** 
  (7.807) (11.140) (7.797) (11.131) (7.770) (11.102) 
SUPERVISOR OCC 0.001** 0.002 0.001** 0.002 0.001** 0.002 
  (2.161) (0.745) (2.153) (0.733) (2.176) (0.761) 
SUPERVISOR FDIC 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 
  (4.194) (3.039) (4.205) (3.052) (4.200) (3.045) 
C. Bank Ownership             
BHC MEMBER 0.002*** 0.030*** 0.002*** 0.029*** 0.002*** 0.030*** 
  (8.245) (13.533) (8.200) (13.482) (8.237) (13.527) 
PUBLICLY LISTED 0.001*** 0.024*** 0.001*** 0.024*** 0.001*** 0.024*** 
  (5.031) (9.048) (4.929) (8.953) (5.010) (9.029) 
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP -0.004*** -0.051*** -0.004*** -0.051*** -0.004*** -0.051*** 
  (-3.459) (-4.848) (-3.457) (-4.842) (-3.465) (-4.853) 
D. Organizational Structure             
BRANCHES / GTA -0.042*** -0.233*** -0.042*** -0.236*** -0.042*** -0.235*** 
  (-6.764) (-4.556) (-6.808) (-4.612) (-6.802) (-4.600) 
LN (NUMBER STATES) -0.004*** -0.047*** -0.004*** -0.046*** -0.004*** -0.047*** 
  (-5.822) (-7.274) (-5.791) (-7.242) (-5.816) (-7.265) 
E. Competition             
HHI DEPOSITS 0.002 0.021 0.002 0.021* 0.002 0.021 
  (1.398) (1.643) (1.406) (1.653) (1.395) (1.640) 
PERCENT METROPOLITAN -0.004*** -0.041*** -0.004*** -0.041*** -0.004*** -0.041*** 
  (-15.218) (-16.231) (-15.254) (-16.274) (-15.197) (-16.219) 
F. Local Economic Conditions             
CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX 0.006*** 0.079*** 0.006*** 0.079*** 0.006*** 0.079*** 
  (16.337) (24.258) (16.295) (24.212) (16.339) (24.260) 
HOUSE PRICE INFLATION 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 
  (4.663) (5.741) (4.672) (5.748) (4.671) (5.747) 
CONSTANT 0.003* 0.004 0.005*** 0.024* 0.004** 0.008 
  (1.746) (0.296) (2.936) (1.655) (1.992) (0.555) 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 48,532 48,532 48,532 48,532 48,532 48,532 







Table 5: Do Cost and Profit Efficiency Affect Bank Failure, Risk, and Profitability during Financial Crises? – Banking Crises and Market 
Crises Results 
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing how cost and profit efficiency affect bank failure, risk, and profitability during banking crises and market crises. 
The dependent variables are: FAILED1 and FAILED2 for bank failure, LN(ΖSCORE) and σROA for bank risk, and ROA and ROE for bank profitability. All independent variables are 
measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. The key explanatory variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and profit efficiency PROFITEFF. COST EFF MOMENTUM is the 
proportion of cost efficiency increases. PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of profit efficiency increases. LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the natural log of 
GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the bank’s total equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the ratio of total loans to GTA. BHC MEMBER is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at any time in the pre-crisis period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real estate loans divided by GTA. 
SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC are dummies that equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC are the primary supervisor of the bank, respectively; both dummies are used in 
regressions (left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRS). FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership. BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO 
is brokered deposits divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO is unused commitments divided by GTA CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is total bank cash holdings divided by 
GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of deposit concentration for the local markets in 
which the bank is present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) as a fraction of deposits in all markets in 
which a bank is active. BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank organizational complexity calculated as (ratio of the number of branches the bank has active over GTA) x 1000. LN 
(NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is 
listed on a stock exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state coincident indexes with the share of 
the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE INFLATION is the weighted average growth in a state-level house price index with the share of the deposits of a given 
bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: 
commercial real estate, residential real estate, construction and industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for 
bank clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Performance Indicator FAILURE RISK PROFITABILITY 
Subsample Banking Crises Market Crises Banking Crises Market Crises Banking Crises Market Crises 
Dependent Variable FAILED1 FAILED2 FAILED1 FAILED2 LN(ZSCORE) σROA LN(ZSCORE) σROA ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Independent Variables & Regression Method LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics                         
COSTEFF -1.533*** -3.525*** 1.059 1.480 0.410*** -0.005*** 0.228** 0.000 0.002** 0.033*** 0.007*** 0.050*** 
  (-3.926) (-6.840) (0.834) (0.369) (5.406) (-4.284) (2.139) (0.125) (2.357) (4.372) (3.738) (3.673) 
PROFITEFF -0.365 -0.666* 0.020 1.773 -0.017 -0.001 -0.122 0.000 -0.001 -0.008 0.000 0.001 
  (-1.388) (-1.899) (0.030) (0.883) (-0.325) (-1.237) (-1.541) (0.282) (-1.310) (-1.447) (0.224) (0.149) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM -0.896*** -2.060*** 0.509 1.118 0.145*** -0.001*** 0.206*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.035*** 
  (-6.119) (-9.959) (0.627) (0.486) (8.665) (-6.605) (2.990) (0.050) (8.225) (9.754) (3.515) (3.851) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM -0.277*** -0.599*** -0.020 0.749 0.020 -0.000 -0.051 0.000 0.000* 0.002 0.001 0.008 
  (-2.579) (-3.288) (-0.051) (0.649) (1.608) (-1.392) (-1.063) (0.157) (1.821) (1.606) (1.375) (1.371) 
OTHER BANK CHARACTERISTICS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 19,066 19,066 29,172 20,826 18,990 18,990 16,160 16,161 19,066 19,066 29,466 29,466 





Table 6: Robustness – Excluding Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) Institutions 
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing how does cost and profit efficiency during normal times impact bank performance (failure, risk, and profitability) 
during financial crises when excluding the too-big-to-fail banks defined in two different ways: GTA greater or equal to 50 Billion and top 19 banks as per GTA in each time period. 
The dependent variable for failure are: FAILED1 and FAILED2. The dependent variables for bank risk are: bank LN(ΖSCORE) and σROA. The dependent variables for bank 
profitability are: ROA and ROE. All independent variables are measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. The key explanatory variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and 
profit efficiency PROFITEFF. COST EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of cost efficiency increases. PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of profit efficiency increases. 
LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the natural log of GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the bank’s total equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the 
ratio of total loans to GTA. BHC MEMBER is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at any time in the pre-crisis period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the 
commercial real estate loans divided by GTA. SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC are dummies that equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC are the primary supervisor of the bank, 
respectively; both dummies are used in regressions (left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRS). FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign 
ownership. BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO is brokered deposits divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO is unused commitments divided by GTA. CASH HOLDINGS 
RATIO is total bank cash holdings divided by GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank is present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) 
as a fraction of deposits in all markets in which a bank is active. BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank organizational complexity calculated as (ratio of the number of branches 
the bank has active over GTA) x 1000. LN (NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if 
a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed on a stock exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s 
state coincident indexes with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE INFLATION is the weighted average growth in a state-level house price 
index with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: commercial real estate, residential real estate, construction and industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Performance Indicator FAILURE RISK PROFITABILITY 
Test 
Excluding Banks  
with GTA  
≥ 50 Billion 
Excluding top 19 banks 
 (per GTA) in each  
time period 
Excluding Banks  
with GTA  
≥ 50 Billion 
Excluding top 19 banks 
 (per GTA) in each  
time period 
Excluding Banks  
with GTA  
≥ 50 Billion 
Excluding top 19 banks 
 (per GTA) in each  
time period 
Dependent Variable FAILED1 FAILED2 FAILED1 FAILED2 LN(ZSCORE) σROA LN(ZSCORE) σROA ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Independent Variables & Regression Method LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics                         
COSTEFF -1.191*** -3.447*** -1.177*** -3.404*** 0.258*** -0.003*** 0.259*** -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.024*** 0.002*** 0.024*** 
  (-3.537) (-6.919) (-3.501) (-6.854) (4.871) (-3.868) (4.902) (-3.887) (3.699) (4.074) (3.689) (4.057) 
PROFITEFF -0.368 -0.657* -0.382 -0.692** -0.053 -0.000 -0.053 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 
  (-1.558) (-1.909) (-1.619) (-2.006) (-1.397) (-1.049) (-1.406) (-1.033) (-1.607) (-1.523) (-1.610) (-1.549) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM -0.804*** -2.010*** -0.800*** -1.993*** 0.154*** -0.001*** 0.155*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.015*** 0.002*** 0.015*** 
  (-5.743) (-10.009) (-5.725) (-9.978) (10.303) (-7.237) (10.318) (-7.254) (9.110) (9.926) (9.075) (9.833) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM -0.291*** -0.611*** -0.294*** -0.620*** 0.017 -0.000** 0.017 -0.000** 0.000** 0.003*** 0.000** 0.003*** 
  (-2.839) (-3.412) (-2.867) (-3.462) (1.577) (-2.179) (1.584) (-2.163) (2.286) (2.753) (2.305) (2.798) 
OTHER BANK CHARACTERISTICS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 48,455 40,002 48,437 39,991 35,084 35,085 35,074 35,075 48,455 48,455 48,437 48,437 




Table 7: Robustness – Controlling for Cost-to-Income  
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing how does cost and profit efficiency during normal times impact bank performance (failure, risk, and profitability) 
during financial crises when controlling for COST-TO-INCOME in columns (1)-(6), and COST-TO-INCOME RANK in columns (7)-(12). The dependent variables for failure are 
FAILED1 and FAILURE2. The dependent variables for bank risk are: bank LN(ΖSCORE) and σROA. The dependent variables for bank profitability are: ROA and ROE. All independent 
variables are measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. The key explanatory variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and profit efficiency PROFITEFF. COST EFF 
MOMENTUM is the proportion of cost efficiency increases. PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of profit efficiency increases. LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the 
natural log of GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the bank’s total equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the ratio of total loans to GTA. BHC MEMBER 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at any time in the pre-crisis period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real estate loans divided by 
GTA. SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC are dummies that equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC are the primary supervisor of the bank, respectively; both dummies are used in 
regressions (left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRS). FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership. BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO 
is brokered deposits divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO is unused commitments divided by GTA. CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is total bank cash holdings divided 
by GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of deposit concentration for the local markets in 
which the bank is present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) as a fraction of deposits in all markets in 
which a bank is active. BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank organizational complexity calculated as (ratio of the number of branches the bank has active over GTA) x 1000. LN 
(NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is 
listed on a stock exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state coincident indexes with the share of 
the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE INFLATION is the weighted average growth in a state-level house price index with the share of the deposits of a given 
bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: 
commercial real estate, residential real estate, construction and industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for 
bank clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
Test: Controlling for Cost-to-Income (Level) Controlling for Cost-to-Income Rank 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Performance Indicator FAILURE RISK PROFITABILITY FAILURE RISK PROFITABILITY 
Dependent Variable FAILED1 FAILED2 LN(ZSCORE) σROA ROA ROE FAILED1 FAILED2 LN(ZSCORE) σROA ROA ROE 
Independent Variables & Regression Method LOGIT LOGIT OLS OLS OLS OLS LOGIT LOGIT OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics                         
COSTEFF -1.182*** -3.367*** 0.256*** -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.024*** -1.048*** -3.149*** 0.253*** -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.024*** 
  (-3.525) (-6.853) (4.834) (-3.938) (3.742) (4.103) (-3.147) (-6.543) (4.798) (-3.914) (3.755) (4.056) 
PROFITEFF -0.370 -0.645* -0.054 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006 -0.298 -0.560 -0.057 -0.000 -0.001 -0.007 
  (-1.575) (-1.906) (-1.421) (-1.085) (-1.622) (-1.553) (-1.253) (-1.630) (-1.511) (-1.004) (-1.620) (-1.613) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM -0.803*** -1.983*** 0.154*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.015*** -0.765*** -1.893*** 0.153*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.015*** 
  (-5.755) (-10.064) (10.275) (-7.230) (9.128) (9.935) (-5.630) (-10.188) (10.220) (-7.203) (9.164) (9.852) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM -0.287*** -0.590*** 0.017 -0.000** 0.000** 0.003*** -0.283*** -0.590*** 0.017 -0.000** 0.000** 0.003*** 
  (-2.820) (-3.395) (1.584) (-2.161) (2.266) (2.724) (-2.788) (-3.372) (1.541) (-2.120) (2.266) (2.678) 
COST-TO-INCOME -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000*             
  (-0.384) (-0.013) (0.315) (0.245) (1.851) (1.662)             
COST-TO-INCOME RANK            1.836*** 1.647*** -0.156*** 0.002*** 0.000 -0.017*** 
            (11.869) (7.358) (-5.264) (4.465) (0.511) (-4.435) 
OTHER BANK CHARACTERISTICS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 48,532 40,067 35,150 35,151 48,532 48,532 48,532 40,067 35,150 35,151 48,532 48,532 




Table 8: Alternative Pre-Crisis Period 
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing how does cost and profit efficiency during normal times impact bank performance (failure, risk, and profitability) 
during financial crises when clustering errors at the bank level. The dependent variable for failure are: FAILED1 and FAILED2. The dependent variables for bank risk are: bank 
LN(ΖSCORE) and σROA. The dependent variables for bank profitability are: ROA and ROE. All independent variables are measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. The key 
explanatory variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and profit efficiency PROFITEFF. COST EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of cost efficiency increases. PROFIT EFF 
MOMENTUM is the proportion of profit efficiency increases. LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the natural log of GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the 
bank’s total equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the ratio of total loans to GTA. BHC MEMBER is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at 
any time in the pre-crisis period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real estate loans divided by GTA. SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC are dummies that 
equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC are the primary supervisor of the bank, respectively; both dummies are used in regressions (left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRS). FOREIGN 
OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership. BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO is brokered deposits divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS 
RATIO is unused commitments divided by GTA. CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is total bank cash holdings divided by GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI 
DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank is present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the 
percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) as a fraction of deposits in all markets in which a bank is active. BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank 
organizational complexity calculated as (ratio of the number of branches the bank has active over GTA) x 1000. LN (NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in 
which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed on a stock exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the 
weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state coincident indexes with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE 
INFLATION is the weighted average growth in a state-level house price index with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s 
loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: commercial real estate, residential real estate, construction and 
industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Performance Indicator FAILURE RISK PROFITABILITY 
Dependent Variable FAILED1 FAILED2 LN(ZSCORE) σROA ROA ROE 
Independent Variables & Regression Method LOGIT LOGIT OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics             
COSTEFF -2.098*** -4.413*** 0.410*** -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.041*** 
  (-5.551) (-8.456) (6.714) (-5.238) (5.871) (6.149) 
PROFITEFF -0.555* -0.546 -0.086 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
  (-1.824) (-1.346) (-1.560) (-0.170) (-0.222) (-0.228) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM -1.380*** -2.583*** 0.277*** -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.028*** 
  (-8.049) (-12.069) (11.324) (-7.923) (9.674) (10.531) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM -0.439*** -0.553** -0.002 -0.000 0.001* 0.007** 
  (-2.599) (-2.400) (-0.083) (-0.088) (1.923) (2.054) 
OTHER BANK CHARACTERISTICS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 48,532 40,067 35,150 35,151 48,532 48,532 





Table 9: Do Cost and Profit Efficiency Affect Bank Failure, Risk, and Profitability during Financial Crises? – Bank Size 
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing how does cost and profit efficiency during normal times impact bank performance (failure, risk, and profitability) 
during financial crises when clustering errors at the bank level. The dependent variable for failure are: FAILED1 and FAILED2. The dependent variables for bank risk are: bank 
LN(ΖSCORE) and σROA. The dependent variables for bank profitability are: ROA and ROE. All independent variables are measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. The key 
explanatory variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and profit efficiency PROFITEFF. COST EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of cost efficiency increases. PROFIT EFF 
MOMENTUM is the proportion of profit efficiency increases. LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the natural log of GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the 
bank’s total equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the ratio of total loans to GTA. BHC MEMBER is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at 
any time in the pre-crisis period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real estate loans divided by GTA. SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC are dummies that 
equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC are the primary supervisor of the bank, respectively; both dummies are used in regressions (left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRS). FOREIGN 
OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership. BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO is brokered deposits divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS 
RATIO is unused commitments divided by GTA. CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is total bank cash holdings divided by GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI 
DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank is present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the 
percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) as a fraction of deposits in all markets in which a bank is active. BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank 
organizational complexity calculated as (ratio of the number of branches the bank has active over GTA) x 1000. LN (NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in 
which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed on a stock exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the 
weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state coincident indexes with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE 
INFLATION is the weighted average growth in a state-level house price index with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s 
loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: commercial real estate, residential real estate, construction and 
industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Performance Indicator FAILURE RISK PROFITABILITY 
Test 
Small Banks 
(GTA ≤1 $Billion) 
Large Banks 
(GTA >1 $Billion) 
Small Banks 
(GTA ≤1 $Billion) 
Large Banks 
(GTA >1 $Billion) 
Small Banks 
(GTA ≤1 $Billion) 
Large Banks 
(GTA >1 $Billion) 
Dependent Variable FAILED1 FAILED2 FAILED1 FAILED2 LN(ZSCORE) σROA LN(ZSCORE) σROA ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Independent Variables & Regression Method LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics                         
COSTEFF -1.096*** -3.380*** -2.810* -5.582*** 0.232*** -0.002*** 0.852*** -0.008* 0.002*** 0.022*** 0.003 0.060** 
  (-3.193) (-6.512) (-1.738) (-2.904) (4.350) (-3.502) (2.959) (-1.934) (3.514) (3.631) (0.785) (2.055) 
PROFITEFF -0.467* -0.732** 1.838** 1.358 -0.056 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001** -0.008* 0.003 0.015 
  (-1.918) (-2.034) (2.161) (1.296) (-1.472) (-0.957) (-0.007) (0.045) (-2.063) (-1.874) (1.233) (0.815) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM -0.771*** -1.978*** -1.850*** -3.219*** 0.147*** -0.001*** 0.235** -0.002 0.002*** 0.015*** 0.001 0.025*** 
  (-5.468) (-9.767) (-3.053) (-2.962) (9.766) (-7.142) (2.463) (-1.193) (8.936) (9.294) (0.632) (2.771) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM -0.309*** -0.630*** 0.093 0.270 0.018 -0.000** 0.031 0.000 0.000** 0.003** 0.001 0.007 
  (-2.973) (-3.421) (0.225) (0.422) (1.621) (-2.368) (0.458) (0.362) (1.971) (2.470) (1.069) (1.085) 
OTHER BANK CHARACTERISTICS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 46,448 38,311 1,616 1,176 33,570 33,571 1,580 1,580 46,448 46,448 2,084 2,084 







Table 10: Do Cost and Profit Efficiency Affect Bank Failure, Risk, and Profitability during Financial Crises? – Testing for Non-Monotonicity 
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing how does cost and profit efficiency during normal times impact bank performance (failure, risk, and profitability) during 
financial crises when testing for non-monotonicity between efficiency and bank performance. The dependent variable for failure are: FAILED1 and FAILED2. The dependent variables for 
bank risk are: bank LN(ΖSCORE) and σROA. The dependent variables for bank profitability are: ROA and ROE. All independent variables are measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. 
The key explanatory variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and profit efficiency PROFITEFF. COST EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of cost efficiency increases. PROFIT EFF 
MOMENTUM is the proportion of profit efficiency increases. LN(GTA) is bank size calculated as the natural log of GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the bank’s total 
equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the ratio of total loans to GTA. BHC MEMBER is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at any time in the pre-
crisis period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real estate loans divided by GTA. SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC are dummies that equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC 
are the primary supervisor of the bank, respectively; both dummies are used in regressions (left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRS). FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank 
has 50% or more foreign ownership. BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO is brokered deposits divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO is unused commitments divided by GTA. 
CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is total bank cash holdings divided by GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) of deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank is present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) 
as a fraction of deposits in all markets in which a bank is active. BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank organizational complexity calculated as (ratio of the number of branches the bank 
has active over GTA) x 1000. LN (NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or 
is part of a BHC that is listed on a stock exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state coincident indexes 
with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE INFLATION is the weighted average growth in a state-level house price index with the share of the deposits 
of a given bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: 
commercial real estate, residential real estate, construction and industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank 
clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Performance Indicator FAILURE RISK PROFITABILITY 
Dependent Variable FAILED1 FAILED2 LN(ZSCORE) σROA ROA ROE 
Independent Variables & Regression Method LOGIT LOGIT OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics             
COSTEFF -4.061*** -9.880*** 0.652*** -0.006** 0.007*** 0.033 
  (-3.478) (-6.417) (3.152) (-2.466) (2.716) (1.414) 
COSTEFF_SQ 2.748** 6.317*** -0.381** 0.003 -0.004* -0.008 
  (2.509) (4.295) (-1.990) (1.479) (-1.788) (-0.389) 
Inflection Point 0.739 0.782 0.856 0.896 0.807 1.952 
Percent of Observation with Predicted Sign (90.7% negative) (94.6% negative)  (98.3% positive) (99.1% negative) + (96.3% positive) (100.0% positive) 
PROFITEFF -0.566 -1.459 0.060 -0.002 0.002 0.022* 
  (-0.921) (-1.639) (0.529) (-1.474) (1.575) (1.713) 
PROFITEFF_SQ 0.188 0.760 -0.110 0.001 -0.003** -0.028** 
  (0.348) (0.978) (-1.080) (1.212) (-2.331) (-2.396) 
Inflection Point 1.506 0.959 0.271 0.693 0.379 0.392 
Percent of Observation with Predicted Sign (100.0% negative) (97.3% negative) (26.4% positive) (70.7% negative) (38.2% positive) (39.9% positive) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM -0.830*** -1.995*** 0.159*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.016*** 
  (-6.056) (-10.837) (10.440) (-7.333) (9.334) (9.967) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM -0.293*** -0.627*** 0.019* -0.000** 0.000** 0.004*** 
  (-2.878) (-3.734) (1.687) (-2.255) (2.531) (2.994) 
OTHER BANK CHARACTERISTICS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 48,532 40,067 35,150 35,151 48,532 48,532 




Table 11: Deeper Analysis of the Cost Efficiency Findings  
This table reports estimates from regression estimates for analyzing how does cost and profit efficiency during normal times impact bank performance (failure, risk and profitability) 
for banks with Good Management (Enforcement Actions against Management = 0) versus banks with Bad Management (Enforcement Actions against Management > 0) in columns 
(1)-(12), and how cost and profit efficiency during normal times affect bank loan performance (NPL/TL and LLA/GTA) during financial crises in columns (13)-(14). The dependent 
variable for failure are FAILED1 and FAILED2. The dependent variables for bank risk are: bank LN(ΖSCORE) and σROA. The dependent variables for bank profitability are: ROA 
and ROE. All independent variables are measured as averages over the pre-crisis periods. The key explanatory variables are cost efficiency COSTEFF and profit efficiency 
PROFITEFF. COST EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of cost efficiency increases. PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM is the proportion of profit efficiency increases. LN(GTA) is bank 
size calculated as the natural log of GTA.CAPITAL RATIO is bank capitalization, defined as the bank’s total equity divided by GTA. TOTAL LOANS / GTA is the ratio of total loans 
to GTA. BHC MEMBER is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank was part of a BHC at any time in the pre-crisis period. COMMERCIAL RE RATIO is the commercial real 
estate loans divided by GTA. SUPERVISOR_OCC and SUPERVISOR_FDIC are dummies that equal 1 if the OCC and FDIC are the primary supervisor of the bank, respectively; 
both dummies are used in regressions (left out category: SUPERVISOR_FRS). FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has 50% or more foreign ownership. 
BROKERED DEPOSITS RATIO is brokered deposits divided by GTA. UNUSED COMMITMENTS RATIO is unused commitments divided by GTA. CASH HOLDINGS RATIO is 
total bank cash holdings divided by GTA. LLA / GTA is loan loss allowance divided by GTA. HHI DEPOSITS is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of deposit 
concentration for the local markets in which the bank is present. PERCENT METROPOLITAN is the percentage of bank deposits in metropolitan markets (MSAs and CBSAs) as a 
fraction of deposits in all markets in which a bank is active. BRANCHES / GTA is a measure of bank organizational complexity calculated as (ratio of the number of branches the 
bank has active over GTA) x 1000. LN (NUMBER STATES) is the natural log of the number of states in which bank has branches. PUBLICLY LISTED is a dummy equal to 1 if a 
bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed on a stock exchange. CHANGE COINCIDENT INDEX is the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s 
state coincident indexes with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. HOUSE PRICE INFLATION is the weighted average growth in a state-level house price 
index with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. LOAN CONCENTRATION is a bank’s loan portfolio concentration is measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of the following six loan categories: commercial real estate, residential real estate, construction and industrial, consumer, agriculture, and other loans. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Performance Indicator FAILURE RISK PROFITABILITY OTHER MEASURES 
Subsample 
Good Management  
(Enforcement Actions  
against Management  
= 0) 
Bad Management  
(Enforcement Actions  
against Management 
>0) 
Good Management  
(Enforcement Actions  
against Management  
= 0) 
Bad Management  
(Enforcement Actions  
against Management 
 >0) 
Good Management  
(Enforcement Actions  
against Management  
= 0) 






the Cost  
Skimping  
Hypothesis 
Dependent Variable FAILED1 FAILED2 FAILED1 FAILED2 LN(ZSCORE) σROA LN(ZSCORE) σROA ROA ROE ROA ROE NPL LLA 
Independent Variables & Regression Method LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Key Independent Variables and Basic Characteristics                             
COSTEFF -1.215*** -3.562*** 2.013 6.085 0.254*** -0.003*** 0.436 -0.006 0.002*** 0.024*** -0.007 -0.075 -0.002*** -0.0003** 
  (-3.548) (-6.925) (0.593) (1.137) (4.765) (-3.846) (0.697) (-0.591) (3.701) (4.055) (-1.083) (-1.350) (-2.739) (-2.016) 
PROFITEFF -0.366 -0.592* 0.775 0.673 -0.065* -0.000 -0.343 0.001 -0.001* -0.008* -0.001 0.007 0.000 0.0001 
  (-1.529) (-1.714) (0.407) (0.253) (-1.704) (-0.873) (-0.997) (0.166) (-1.808) (-1.802) (-0.180) (0.192) (0.532) (1.280) 
COST EFF MOMENTUM -0.816*** -2.111*** 1.315 4.499 0.155*** -0.001*** 0.237 -0.002 0.002*** 0.016*** -0.006 -0.070 -0.001*** -0.0002*** 
  (-5.739) (-10.030) (0.492) (1.285) (10.316) (-7.289) (0.530) (-0.344) (9.194) (10.032) (-1.421) (-1.615) (-4.313) (-4.882) 
PROFIT EFF MOMENTUM -0.283*** -0.572*** -0.340 -0.535 0.017 -0.000** -0.361* 0.002 0.000** 0.003** -0.001 -0.002 -0.000* 0.0000 
  (-2.761) (-3.202) (-0.308) (-0.357) (1.527) (-2.128) (-1.665) (0.563) (2.173) (2.574) (-0.572) (-0.093) (-1.653) (0.068) 
OTHER BANK CHARACTERISTICS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CRISIS FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BANK CLUSTERS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 47,654 39,477 856 576 34,291 34,292 859 859 47,654 47,654 878 878 48,532 48,532 
PSEUDO R2 / ADJ. R2 0.297 0.303 0.283 0.343 0.212 0.101 0.222 0.151 0.127 0.181 0.092 0.147 0.246 0.526 
 
